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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
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-vsSCOlTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; BART and ALANE
MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; and DOES I
through V,
Defendants-Respondents.
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Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.
HONORABLE RENAE J. HOFF, Presiding

Jon M. Steele and Karl J. Runft, RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC,
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400, Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Appellant
Susan E. Buxton and Tamrny A. Zokan, MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE,
CHARTERED, 950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520, Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Respondents
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Case: CV-2005-0009800-C Current Judge: Renae J. Hoff

Goodman 011
Company vs. Scottys Duro Buiit Generator, eta1
Goodman 0 1 Company vs. Scottys Duro Buiit Generator, Bart Mcknight, Alane Mcknight

Other Claims
Judge

Date
911912005

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

New Case Filed-other Claims
Summons Issued (3)

-

Filing: A1 Civii Complaint, More Than $1000 No Prior Appearance Paid
'by: Steele, Jon M (attorney for Goodman Oil Company) Receipt number:
0137672 Dated: 9/19/2005 Amount: $82.00 (Check)

Renae J. Hoff

9/27/2005

Acceptance of service (fax)

Renae J. Hoff

10/3/2005
10/12/2005

Acceptance of Service
Answer
Filing: 12A - Civil Answer Or Appear. > $300, Not > $1000 No Prior
Appearance Paid by: Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke Receipt number:
0141827 Dated: 10/12/2005 Amount: $52.00 (Check)
Notice Of Service of responses to pltf. first set of interrogatories request for
production of documents and request for admissions to scotty's duro-bilt
and Bart McKnight
Notice Of Service (fax)

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

10/24/2005

1211512005

Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Service
Pltfs first supplemental responses
Notice Of Service

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Notice of change of address
Lodged memorandum in support of defendants' motion for summary
judgment and motion to dismiss
Affidavit of Christopher Yorgason in support of defendants motion for
summary judgment and motion to dismiss
Defendants' Motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Hearing
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/03/2006 09:OO AM)

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

7/6/2006

Amended Notice Of Hearing 9-5-06
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/05/2006 03:OO PM) sum judg

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

8/22/2006

Request For Trial Setting
Motion for summary judgment on issues of liability
Brief in reponse to def mo for summary judgment & mo to Dismiss

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

111712006
3/20/2006
611612006

6/29/2006

Renae J. Hoff

Affidavit of Jon M Steele in support of mo sum judgment

8/25/2006

8/28/2006
-8/29/2006

Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Hearing 10-2-06 9:00
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/02/2006 09:OO AM) Plt sum
judgment
Amended Notice Of Hearing 10-24-06
Renae J. Hoff
Hearing result for Motion ~ e a r i n g
held 0n'l0/02/2006 09:OO AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff
Vacated Plt sum judgment
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/24/2006 0 : 0 0 AM) sum judg
Renae J. Hoff
Response To Request For Trial Setting
Affidavit of tammy a zokan in support of defendants motion for summary
judgment and motion to dismiss

800001

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Date: 611012008
Time: 02:51 PM
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Case: CV-2005-0009800-C Current Judge: Ronae J. Hoff

Goodman Oil Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, etal.
Goodman Oil Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, Bart Mcknight, Alano Mcknight

Other Claims
Judge

Date
Defendants reply in support of defendants motion for summary judgment
and motion to dismiss
of car1j withroe in support of defendants motion for summary judgment
and motion to dismiss
Affidavit of Jon M Steele in support of Goddmans Motion to strike the
affidavit of Carl J Withroe in support of defendants motion for summary
judgment and motion to dismiss
Motion to strike the affidavit of Carl J Withroe in support of defendants
motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/05/2006 03:OO PM: Interim
Hearing Held Motion to Dismiss Dof McKnights Granted
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/24/2006 10:30 AM) sum judg
(CHANGED FROM 11:00 AM TO 10:30 AM)
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of McKnights' motion for attorney foes
and costs
Bart and Alane McKnight's memorandum of costs and attorney fees
Bart and Alane McKnight's brief in support of memorandum of costs and
attorney fees
Order for Expedited Transcript
Order of Dismissal of Bart And Aiane MckNight
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action
Goodmans Motion for reconsideration of order Dismissing BArt & Alane
Mcnight Individually
Affidavit of Jon M Steele in support of Goodmans Mo for reconsideration
Goodmans Objection to def BArt & Alane McKnights memo of cost & atty
fee
Brief in support of Goodmans mo for reconsideration of Order Dismissing
BArt & Alane Mcknight
Brief in support of Goodmans objection to def BArt & Alane Mcknights
memo of costs &fees
Notice Of Hearing 10-24-06 10:30
Defednant's response in objection to plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment
Second Affidavit of Tammy Zokan
Goodman's reply brief
Second Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of the McKnight's
memorandum of costs and fees
Bart and Alane McKnight's reply in support of memorandum of costs and
attorney fees
Defenant's response in objection to'plaintiffs,motion for reconsideration
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 1012412006 10:30 AM: Interim
Hearing Held sum judg
Order (Plt mo reconsider denied
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment

000002

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renao J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Ronao J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Date: 611012008
Time: 02:51 PM
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Case: CV-2005-0009800-C Current Judge: Renae J. Hoff

Goodman Oil Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, eta1
Goodman Oil Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, Bart Mcknight, Aiane Mcknight

Other Claims
Judge

Date
12/26/2006

Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan inSupport of Defendant's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment
Notice Of Hearing
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/25/2007 09:OO AM) Summary
Judgment
Brief in Response to Def Second motion for summary Judgment (fax
Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan Regarding Notice of Errata

Renae J. Hoff

Defendant's Notice of Errata
Motion Granted D's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Tammy A Zokan in support of Mcknight amended memo of atty
fees & costs
BArt & Alane Mcknights amended memo of Costs and atty Fees
BArt & Aiane McKnights Brief in support of amended memo of costs & atty
fee
Duro Biits Memorandum of costs & atty fees
Duro Biits Brief in support of memo of costs and atty fees

-

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Hearing 3-22-07 10:OO
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/22/2007 10:OO AM) memo of
costs
Order (summary judgment granted)
Brief in support of goodman's objection to defendant' memorandum of
costs and attorney fees
Goodman's motion for reconsideration of order granting defendant's
second motion for summary judgment
Brief in support of Goodman's motion for reconsideration of order granting
defendant's second motion for summary judgment

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Affidavit of Jon Steele in support of goodman's motion for reconsideration
of order granting defendant's second motion for summary judgment
Defs respsonse in objection to plaintiffs feb 23 2007 motion for
reconsideration
Defs motion to strike
Affidavit of Christina Fenner in support of defendants motion to strike
Affidavit of Tammy A Zokan in support of defs motion to strike and defs
reply in supp of memo of costslatty fees
DuroBiits and the Mcknights reply in supp of memo of costslatty fees

Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Hearing on Defs Motion to Strike
Objection to motion to strike and reply memo to defs response memo in
supp of memo of atty fees/costs and replys to defs response in obj to
plaintiffs 02-23-07 motion for reconsideration
.4,,
AffidaviffJon M Steele in support of objection

onnnnn

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff
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Case: CV-2005-0009800-C Current Judge: Renae J. Hoff

Goodman 011
Company vs. Scottys Duro Bu~itGenerator, eta1
Goodman 011
Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, Bart Mckn~ght,Aiane Mcknight

Other Claims
Judge

Date
311612007
3/20/2007

6/1/2007

7/3/2007
7/6/2007

Defendants' reply in support of motion to strike
Motion to Deem Goodman's amended renewed objection to def. Bart and
Alane McKnights' memorandum of cost
Affidavit of Jon Steele in support of motion to Deem Goodman's amended
renewed objection to defendants Bart and Aiane McKnights' memorandum
of costs
Motion to shorten time

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff
Notice Of Hearing 3-22-07
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/22/2007 10:OO AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff
Heldlmo for reconsideration deniedlcosts & fees graned
Renae J. Hoff
Order (Pit mo for reconsideration denied
Renae J. Hoff
Duro Bilts Amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees
Renae J. Hoff
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of the Mcknights second amended
memo of costs
Renae J. Hoff
Mcknights Second Amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees
Renae J. Hoff
Affidavit of Tammy AZokan in support of Duro-Biits amended memo of
costs & atty fees
Goodman's Renewed Objection to Defendants Bart and Aiane McKnights' Renae J. Hoff
Second Amended Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees Dated Aprii 5,
2007, and Objection to Duro-Biit's Amended Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees Dated Aprii 5, 2007
Renae J. Hoff
Goodman's Second Motion for Reconsideration of order granting
defednat's second motion for summary judgment
Renae J. Hoff
Affidavit of Jon M Steeie in support of goodman's second motion for
reconsideration of order granting defendant's second motion for summary
judgment
Renae J. Hoff
brief in support of goodman's second motion for reconsideration of order
granting defendant's second motion for summary judgment
Renae J. Hoff
Notice Of Hearing 7-26-07
Renae J. Hoff
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/26/2007 09:OO AM)
reconsideration
Renae J. Hoff
Defendants' Motion to strike plaintiffs second motion for reconsideration
Defendants' Memorandum in support of their motion to strike and response Renae J. Hoff
in objection to plaintiffs May 14, 2007, second motion for reconsideration
Notice Of Hearing on sefendants' motion to strike 7-26-06
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Defendants' Motion for entry of judgment
Renae J. Hoff
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of defendants' motion for entry of
judgment
Renae J. Hoff
Notice Of Hearing on defendants' motion for entry of judgment 7-26-07
Renae J. Hoff
Pltfs Notice of withdrawal of second motion for reconsideration
Renae J. Hoff
Defs Memorandum of costs and Attys fees for costs and fees difinding
against Pits second Motion for Reconsideration
Renae J. Hoff
Affidavit of Tammv A Zokan in s u ~ ~ oofr Defs
t
memorandum of Attv fees
and costs

Tr
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Case: CV-2005-0009800-C Current Judge: Renae J. Hoff

Page 5 of 5

Goodman Oil Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, etai
Goodman 011
Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, Bart Mcknlght. Alane Mcknlght

Other Claims
Date

Judge
Defs brief in support of memorandum of costs and atty fees

Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Hearing on Defs Memo of costs and atty fees

Renae J. Hoff

7/26/2007

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/26/2007 09:OO AM: Motion
Granted reconsiderationlmotn to strike

Renae J. Hoff

8/7/2007

Order for atty fees & Costs$23,674.14
Brief in support of Pit Motn for entry of Judg

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Motion for entry of Judg
Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in support of Motn for entry of judgment
Hearing Scheduied (Motion Hearing 11/05/2007 11:OO AM) mo for entry
of judgment
Notice Of Hearing 11-5-07 11:00
Defendants' Motion to strike plaintiffs motion for entry of judgment

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

7/6/2007

10/16/2007

10/19/2007

10/24/2007

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Defendants' Memorandum in support of their motion to strike and response Renae J. Hoff
in objection to plaintiffs motion for entry of judgment
Renae J. Hoff
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan
Renae J. Hoff
Notice Of Hearing on defendatns' motion to strike
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/05/2007 11:OO AM)
PlaintiWs response to defendants' memorandum in support of their motion
to strike and reply to defendants' response in objection to plaintiffs motion
for entry of judgment
Defendants' reply to plaintiffs responselreply filed october 29, 2007

Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

Renae J. Hoff

Second Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of defendants' motion to strike Renae J. Hoff
and objection to plaintiffs' motion for entry of judgment
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/05/2007 11:00 AM) mo for entry Renae J. Hoff
of judgment
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/05/2007 11:OO AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff
Vacated motion to strike - WITHDRAWN
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/05/2007 11:OO AM: Motion Renae J. Hoff
Denied mo for entry of judgment
Renae J. Hoff
Ordedjudgment is denied)
Renae J. Hoff
Appealed To The Supreme Court
Renae J. Hoff
Notice of appeal
Filing: T Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court ($86.00 Directly to Supreme Renae J. Hoff
Court Plus this amount to the District Court) Paid by: Steele, Jon M
(attorney for Goodman Oil Company) Receipt number: 0279159 Dated:
11/26/2007 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Goodman Oil Company (plaintiff)
Renae J. Hoff
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 279166 Dated 11/26/2007 for 100.00)(For
Clerk's Record)
Renae J. Hoff
S C - Order Denying Motion to Consolidate

-

S C - Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal
S C - Order Granting Motion for ~econsiderition
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 313198 Dated 5/16/2008 for 450.00)(for
Court Reporters Transcript)
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Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff
Renae J. Hoff

CANYON COUNTY CLERK

&-&qJhw, DDPUT'

JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J. F. RUNFT (ISB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208 333-8506
Facsimile: 208-343-3246
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com

FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,

1

Plaintiff,

1
1
1

)

VS.

-4%m

case NO&DS

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR

INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and

Steele and Karl J. Run&, and for causes of action against Defendants, complains and alleges as
follows:
I. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at the time of the incident which is the subject matter
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 1

.-y. :.
.:,

7,:;
i.,

of this litigation that Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt, Inc., ("Duro-Bilt"), was and is an
Idaho corporation with its principal place of business in the County of Canyon, State of
Idaho.

2. Plaintiffis informed and believes that at the time of the incident which is the subject matter
of this litigation that Defendants Bart and Alane McKnigHt, ("McKnight"), husband and
wife, were and are residents of the County of Canyon, State of Idaho.

responsible in some manner for the acts and omissions of their agent or employee or have
some statutory or vicarious liabiity to Plaintiff. Plaintiffwill move this Court to allow
amendments when the identities and roles of Doe Defendants become known.

6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the above named Defendants pursuant to and
by virtue of Idaho Code 9 5-514 and other applicable laws and rules.

7. Venue is proper in Canyon County pursuant to and by virtue of Idaho Code 9 5-404 and
other applicable laws and rules.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 2

111. STATEMENT O F FACTS

8. On August 2, 1995, Defendant Duro-Bilt, the Blamires Family Trust, T.J. Forest, Inc., and
the Plaintiff; Goodman Oil Company ("Goodman"), entered into a Property Owner Street
Vacation Agreement ('Vacation Agreement") whereby the parties consented to the City
of Nampa's vacation as public right-of-way of First Avenue South located between Blocks
16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition to the City of Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho.

a perpetual easement upon the vacated property for the purpose of access to and iiom their
property.
11. The parties also agreed to fully cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of the

13. On August 3, 1995, Goodman submitted an application to the City for vacation of First
Avenue South between 2nd Street South and 3rd Street South.
14. On July 28,2004, Goodman entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with James R.
Wylie ("Wylie") whereby Goodman agreed to sen and Wylie agreed to purchase
Goodman's property adjoining First Avenue South.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 3

15. A true and correct copy of the Purchase and Sale Agreement is attached to this Complaint
as Exhibit B.

16. Closing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement was contingent upon the City completing the
vacation of Fist Avenue South.
17. The Purchase and Sale Agreement provided for a purchase price of Six Hundred Thousand

($600,000.00) Dollars.

Wylie.

20. The existing constructed portion of First Avenue South to be vacated is 40 feet in width
back of curb to back of curb.

24. Title to the vacated property will be subject to an easement reserved by the City for
utilities.

25. On August 16,2004, the Vacation Ordinance ("Ordinance No. 3374'3 was approved by
the Council and the Mayor.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 4

26. At the Council meeting held August 16,2004, the Mayor declared Ordiiance No. 3374

passed and directed the City Clerk to record it as required by law.
27. The Mayor, after signing O r d i i c e No. 3374 delivered the Ordinance to the City Clerk,

surrendering possession and control of the Ordinance to the City Clerk on August 16,
2004.
28. On or about August 17,2004, the City Clerk delivered Ordinance No. 3374 to the Idaho

Press Tribune with instructions that the Ordinance be published on August 23,2004.
29. Sometime after August 17, 2004, but prior to August 23, 2004, Defendant McKnight

contacted the City and attempted to verbally withdraw Duro-Bit's consent to the vacation
of First Avenue South
30. McKnight is a fiiend of the Mayor.
31. McKnight phoned the Mayor, and the Mayor agreed to veto Ordiiance No. 3374.

Council, signed by the Mayor and City Clerk on August 16,2004, and then vetoed by the
Mayor on September 2,2004, is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit C.
35. On September 3,2004, one day aAer the Mayor's veto, Defendants sent a letter to the City

attempting to withdraw Defendants' consent to the vacation of First Avenue South

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 5

36. Defendants did not inform Goodman that Duro-Bilt had attempted to withdraw its consent

to the vacation.
37. A true and accurate copy of Duro-Bilt's letter is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit D.
38. At no time prior to the Mayor's veto of O r d i i c e No. 3374, did Defendants give

Goodman notice of Duro-Bilt's attempt to withdraw its consent to the vacation of First
Avenue South.

41. Goodman has instituted proceedings against the City of Nampa to have First Avenue South

vacated by Writ of Mandamus.
42. The Preemptory Writ of Mandamus was granted on August 7,2005, in case 04-10007,

44. Goodman re-alleges all prior allegations set forth in this Complaint.
45. The Vacation Agreement is a contract between Goodman and Duro-Bilt.
46. Duro-Bilt breached the Vacation Agreement.
47. The attempted withdrawal of conserlt to the vacation of Fist Avenue South is a breach of

Defendants' obligations set forth in the vacation Agreement.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 6
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48. Defendants' have breached the Vacation Agreement in the following manner:
a. Their obligation to consent to the vacation of First Avenue South;
b. Their obligation to grant and convey a perpetual easement upon the vacated street
for the purpose of access to and from the parties' properties;
c. Their obligation to M y cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of the
Vacation Agreement is accomplished;

to the amount of property each party owns; and

E Their promise that the Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit
of the parties and their respective successors, assigns heirs, and personal

of Goodman's property.

51. Goodman has been damaged by Defendants' breach of the Vacation Agreement in an
amount to be proven at trial.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 7

V. COUNT TWO - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH

PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
52. Goodman re-alleges all prior allegations set forth in this Complaint.

53. A contract existed between Goodman and Wylie for the purchase and sale of Goodman's
property adjoining First Avenue South.

54. Defendants had knowledge of the contract between Goodman and Wylie.

amount to be proven at trial.

VI. COUNT THREE - NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH

59. The Defendants knew or should have known of the existence of this economic relationship.
60. By notifying the City of Nampa of the withdrawal of their consent to the vacation of First
Avenue South, the Defendants disrupted Goodman's relationship with Wylie causing the
sale to fail.

61. The Defendants' failed to act with reasonable care.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 8

62. Goodman has suffered injury resulting from the Defendants' disruption with Goodman's
economic relationship in an amount to be proven at trial.

W. COUNT FOUR - INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH

PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
63. Goodman re-alleges all prior allegations set forth in this Complaint.

65. The Defendants knew of the existence of this economic relationship.
66. By notifying the City of Narnpa of the withdrawal of their consent to the vacation of First
Avenue South, the Defendants disrupted Goodman's relationship with Wiley causing the
.

'

sale to fail.
'

.

67. The Defendants' intended to and did disrupt this relationship.

VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
69. Goodman hereby demands a jury trial on all issues triable to a jury. Goodman does not
stipulate to a six (6) person jury or a jury consisting of any number of persons less than
twelve (12).

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 9

WHEREFORE, PlaintBGoodman requests the following relief:

1. Entry of a Judgment against Duro-Bilt in an amount to be proven at trial;
2. Entry of a decree requiring Duro-Bilt to specifically perform all of its contractual
obligations set forth in the Vacation Agreement;

3. For an award of costs and attorneys fees againit Duro-Bilt pursuant to the

DATED this

1
6 day of September, 2005.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorney for Petitioner

Attorney for Petitioner

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 10
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STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Ada

1

CHARLES CONLEY, after beiig duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

IN WITNESS WHERJ?OF, said Petitioner/PlaintBhas set his hand and seal the day and
year &st above written.
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 1 1
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PROPERTY OWNER
STREET VACATION AGREEMENT

This Agreement is entered into by and between SCOTTY'S DURO-BUILT
GENERATOR, INC.; BLANlRES FAMILY TRUST; T.J. FOREST, INC.; and GOODMAN
OIL COMPANY, an Idaho corporation, collectively referred to herein as "the parties."

WITNESSETH:

Recorder;
WHEREAS, BLAMIRES FAMILY TRUST owns real property described as a
portion of Lots 1, 2, and 3, Block 16, Pleasants Addition to the City of Nampa, County of

WHEREAS, GOODMAN OIL COMPANY owns the real property located at Lots
4,5, and 6 of Block 16, Pleasants Addition, and Lots 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 of Block 19, Pleasants .. ..

w

iV

n

rl
0

0
R

PROPERTY OWNER STREET VACATION

a
0
I
V1

r

c.r
TV
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EXHIBIT
A

Addition, all in the City of Narnpa, County of Canyon, State of Idaho, as designated on the
official plat filed within the office of the Canyon County Recorder; and
WHEFSAS, the parties' property abo~e-describedsurrounds and adjoins First
Avenue South as it divides Blocks 16 and 19 of the Pleasants Addition in the City of Nampa,
County of Canyon, State of Idaho.
NOW THEREFORE, the parties, for good and valuable consideration the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, agree as follows:
That the parties consent to the City of Nampa's vaca
Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition above-desc
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

2.

That the parties grant and convey among themselves, their agents,

licensees, and assignees a perpetual easement upon vacated First Avenue South for the purpose
of access to and from their property from both Second and Third Street located in Nampa,
Canyon County, Idaho. The actual location of the easement shall be at the discretion of
owner of the vacated property upon the City's vacation of First Avenue South as de
herein.

3.

That the parties shall fully cooperate to ensure that the pu

of this Agreement shall be accomplished. The parties shall execute a formalized agreement
recognizing the rights and obligations of the parties upon the City of Nampa's vacation of First
Avenue South as described herein. The parties shall equally share in the maintenance of said
easement in proportion to the amount of property they own which adjoins First Avenue South

as described herein.

-

PROPERTY 0WNER STREET VACATION AGREEMENT 2.

.. ..

4.

That the parties shall hold each other harmless and indemnify the other

parties from their negligent acts and that of their agents in maintaining and using said access
easement.

5.

This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the

parties and their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives.
SCOTTY'S DURO-BUILT GENERATOR, INC.

T.J. FOREST, INC.

I L ~31
,

Date

GOODMAN OIL COMPANY '..

PROPERTY OWNER STREET VACATION AGRE-
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STATE OF IDAHO

County of

AljlR

) ss.

On this z % a y of
before me, the undersigned, a Notary
Public in and for said sfate,
McKNIGHT, known to me to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

IN WJTNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

STATE OF IDAHO
) ss.

County o f J 4 B &
On this &d'ay

of /?U~(CSI, 1995, before me, the undersigned, a Notary

such trust executed the

..

Commission Expires: &&6VJ,j'

PROPERTY OWNER S W E T VACATION AGRE-

- 4.

.

STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of

) ss.
)

&

,1995, before me, the undersigned, a Notary
o n this3/JLYof
Public in and for said state, p e r s a y &peared KURT BATEY, known to me to be the
President of T.J.FOREST,INC.,which is the corporation that executes this instrument and the
person who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged to me that
such corporation executed the same.
IN WITBESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal, the day and year in this certificate first above written.

STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of 9
, DA

) ss.
)
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EXHIBIT A.

.f
,

?:;
. \.,~,

C0W)ntlERCIALIINVESFMiFMTREAL ESTATE
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
THIEIS A LCQAUI PIWINO C C ~ C T ~EHIAE
.
BIG&I(O, IUD THE ENTIRE DOCUME~I~.
INC~UDING THE
OENERILL PRINTW YflOVISIONS dNC ATTACliNSEXTS. C YOU W V E AN? OVESTON9 BEFORE fiIONWO.
CONJULT TOUR A n O R N E I ANDICR BCCQUNTANT.

Buu.lllnuiP,
O~rn+.aL,

--

rD # 04-07 7
DATE U y 2 8 , 2 0 0 4
1. RE4L ESTATE OFFICES:
Listing h ~ e n c y
&R..P~~Ies
Sulling Agency iyichensr lnvesr@.enrs. LIP
Phone: Y3-4090
Listing Agent BaP?MaSslliny Agent L-loyf&hener
.- Phone: &$tics3202
2. WPRESENPhTlON COWFIRMATIOPE:
Cheuk one (1) box in Section 1 below and one (1) box in S ~ c t ~ o2 nbelow 'to confirm that in this transaction. t h e
brokeregels1 involved had Pha tollowing relationshipls~with thu 8UYER(SI snd SELLERIS).
Section 1 :
A. Th& bfoker working with rhe SUYER!St is acting ss an AGENT for the BUYEH(S1.
8. Tho broker working with ?he BUYER(S1 is acling as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BkJYER(S).
C. The broker working wirh the BUYERCS) is acting es a NONAGENT for the BUYER(S1.

--

a
a

a A.

The broker working wirh the SELLERIS) is actitrg a8 aa AGENT for the S'ELLE
Tho broker workingwith the SEUER(St is acting a6 a LIMITED DUAL AGENT
broker working wit$ the SELLER(S1 is acting as a NONAGENT for the SEI'
8ig.nlng this dacumenr confirms that he or *he has rcelved; road and und
nd he8 elected the ralationihip confirmsdet~ove. In udditlon,' each piyrtycon
PARTY
ca policy was rnad~euailablst c i ins~ectionand reviwuv.
"CUST0MER"ND
IS NOT REPRESENTED BY 4 BROKER UNLESS THERE I$ A SIGNED WFliTEN
T FOR AGENCY REPRESENTATION.
.
3. BUYER;
James A. Wylie or A&ns
IHereinatter oelled 'Buyer" agrees to puruhase and ale bniefsigned Seller agrees
fo sell the following described
.
real estere herelnsftcr referred to w 'Propwry."
4. PROPERTY ADDRESS 4ND LEQAL DESCRIPTION: The prnparfv commonly known 8s TEJD Second Street
.&mp,qJ&Q.J+l1.22 acre@ City of
Counrv of .Caw.fdaho !@gailydescribed as: Tamed-bx

I7 6.

EACH

~~

---

--

~

m~~

i!a(s Dollars l6.6.0~03
y Earnest Money deposit.
,
.
ance of tha purehsse price to be p
. .
. ...- . .
a) 8uyer hereby deposlrs

.

88 E ~ r i W s t Money and
1$LOQQl,evldencedby:
Cesh
Check
Cas
b) Eorie8t Money ro be'depa%ite$in rrust sccoun
@!&#3rnonts
Trw! for the benefit of the parties. her
INCLUDED ITZlM15: A l l atteohed floor caverings.
equlPmen1, attached plurnblnu,. bathroom snd lis
---.,-.
dvors, window &veringi exterior trees. plants or shubbery, water hearing apparatus end f i n
cs equipment. awnings, vantilating, wcllag and heating systems, builr-in and "drop-In" raoges
er rangeat, fuel ranks and Ifrig8tiopl flnurss and usuiornent, and anv end all. if env.
,. water and .wafer rinhts.
" ..
and erly and an, if env. dirchecr end ditch rights that are appunenanf rhereio that are now on or used in connaction
wirh the prernisss shell be Included in the sale unless crtnsrvvise provided herein.
Other Items specifically included in this sob: &&.er:d
#20
lrems apeclficdly oxcluded In the seie: 5.6 !/B ana $26

0

a

-

-

~

~

---

Buyer end 8olsr aoknohhd

Ipt 01

this pew, whio
I Soi.#@r's
initial1

W P ef
~

1 Adr Catntr Atsuslatruri
LI~.I.
C~*imlsr!crn who a., i8ie n.mbw at the NIlim.1

d.dprd l o r ond s
i~*oti8t!*ns! REALTOC6R.

.

--

PROPERn ADPRESS: T B D - S f c c u . ! South & Namoa BL?d,-Nam-ua. Idaho 1D #0-4:0.71
8. ADDITIONAL TERMS. CONDfllONS, AND/OR CONTINGENCIES: The closing of this transaorion IS contlngen1 upon
written $adsfaction or walver of tha foilowing c~ndirionz:
--2&Dfi09~~
oa
.r,-1
ye
!j.d
bv Seller and bv Ms!."
2,,
Title R w - b y S . e & g r .
.------~
L
@
,. ,
U
J,...L va~e.!iqn of M
~
. , e.$e
'~
Buyer wlll have unril w ! e , & r
scceotanos to satisfy or woive all conditions andlor contingencies.
9. TITLE COMBANQICLOSING AGENCY: eJ Tho partics agree thar Cand.~L\merica
Transnqti,~nTitle Company shall
-. ~~provide env required Titlo Polloy and preliminary roport afnommitment, b) The Closing ~ ~ o nfor
i yi h i s 'irensscrion
shall be ~
c
, Tronsnarion
o
Titlq.
Each party agrees t o
f the Closing Agency's fee.
10. T~TLEINSURANCE:
for d standard Owner's ni Purchaser's Title Policy pren~iumIn this transcrcrior.
Purchaser's Extandcd
e Title PO~ICV
requested
Yes
No. Addi~ionalPremium rc be paid by
Tit k=
tompanv to plovido all parries to this Agreement with e preliminary Tiire Repon or1 or before 1-5 davs from
i%.WUZQ. Buyer shell have until .55dd~y2to obiecl in wfiting to the condltbn of the jirle as set forth in the report.
ritten objocrion to rhe T~tle,Soller shall have a reasonable tlme, not r o exceed.
defect$ of title or provide aifirrnqtiye Till? ln$vence coverage. ~ c l y e r m a yelect, ss:lt$,.
lnate this'Agra~emenrcr~curu
the defects at $uyer's.ex~ense, or proceed'tpclo~lng. .:
'
Uefects:. If Buyer d o e ~ n u t , s vobjecr!,
.
Fuyiir shallbe~deemodto haveaccepted t h a
event Buyer elocrs t? teiminare rhe ~ ~ r e d m e due
n t r o u n ~ a i l ? f ~ c t otitic
r.y..,. co,nditiors,
..
he returnof ,ali..refunditble.dep@sir6
made
. ,
by him but that such return ot deposits shall.,,
bthbr remedies a ~ ~ ~ i l a bBbyer.
l ~ t o Tho Title ~ 0 m p a n ~ ' i h sdeliver
ll
the final T i ~ l e
ssible efter cfosing.
escrowlcollqcrion is involved, rhen the escrow1colleotian holder shall be
of escrow!colluclion fees.
1Z.CLOSlNO DATE; On or befoce tho closing date. Buyer and Seller shall deposit with the Ciasing Agoncy all funds
and inaluments necesrdry t o complete fhe sale. The closing dale shall be nu later than Lday-s from r e m g t @ M
.wDSkQm&
"Closing Dsto" means the date on which all documenrs ere either recorded or aocapted by an
e e c r o w k o l i ~ r ~ oagency
n
end the sale prvcaads are av~ilsbleto Seller.

--

.

--

-

e,
.

~

0

p

a.

rovided. that the amount ro b e pqld tp, Seller's Broker: shall no
:lar and b y e r spe&ifi~ally&knowledgo and agree rhar if Selle
damages. 'such shell be Seller's sole and ewoiuslvs romedy, and
e. It Seller siems to proceed under (21, the holder of the Earnest
by Sellor's Broker o n behalf of Seller and Buyer related t o the
s of bfok~ragefees, tiile insurance, egorow fees, credit repoq
fees, inspection f w s and attorney's fees, with any baiance of tne Earnest Money t o be held pending resolurion of
tho matter, K S d l v r dsf9!&~, having approved said raip and fails to consummate the same es herein agrcod.
E u Y ~ ?Earnest
'~
Money depoglt r;hail be returnod to himlhcr and Seller shall Day for the aoscs of ri!le insursnee,
escrow fees, credlr report fees. inwection fees, btakerage fees end arromey's fuss, If any. This shall not be
considered a3 a walver b y Buyer of anwothor lawful rioht if
remedv to which euver mav be entitled.
Buyer and ~ell'or
Buymr'm inltids I
P Soilvr'a lnitiels

'

1."-'C$llV

CI)DD"SC-TO

#

W W U-IVTld

lI..\.

nlv.:'. N1,#.

.rm---*l-nrgm

13.

,EI

Id.,,,

*

91'271

~ u n ~ u carrcrir: II h ~ ~ n party
ar
lnlrlsras oi%iC8nos any arolrrerion or legal action or proceedings, whlch are, in
5nv way conn~arndwith ?hi3 Ar~rmamAnP,the prwaiiing parlv shall be enetled t o recovqr from tho ncn.provaillng

uorty rearanebls coats ei%rln i l v ~ t i r v ' rr ~ n * ,; * , t I c ~ * l i a* ~~ t ~a . l r v u v t r w t r l rues 01,u p p a l .
16. dARNE$T MONW DISPUTEIINTSWPLEAC)ERi Notwirhstend~ngbny ttfmjnoricn of rhis contract, Buyw~a ~ i JSallar
a n r w that in I ~ P@van?nf anv cnntrvvvrrv rooardinq rho E.m.n+
M o n o v "nrt thinon o< v n ~ , ,hnlrl
~
hy Rmlr-r
closing sguncy, unless nrurual wt.ittv~iioirirul;~iu~~s
dra rs?ctrivad by the holder of rhe Eornesr Money and things 01
value. Broker or closing agenav shell not be ro~uirnrlrn inkn any nctlon hut may await *ny procooding, o.
Broker's or ciosino bornsv'n ontion nnd noln rlhnmrinn m - v intsrnlr*A -11 p x i t i o ~and J . p . 4 ~ r r . l y t r j v t i u y u u r thinso
or v r l u u 1:nu v oourr of oompotonr lurladier~an0 7 0 s n n i l ~ e ~ o v eCOU?
r
costs and reasonable attoo iwy's lavs.
77,TlTW CONV%YANCE: Tltlo of Seller Is to be ccnvevad bv warranrv deed or
d p ~ d , rind ii. to h p
marke%olio and ivruurwblu vxvwpl lor rights roeorvod In tcdoral potunrs. building or use rkstrrGttons, builrliny b ? i J
zonina roclulptlon~3-d wdinnnnnn n P n n y gnvn-nmnnral i , m i r , rlqhrr o < v,n,r .nd r.s-tr+-.,,cu
rv~rlr~iui.ud
vr
ruesrd
and onv orher liens, encumhrannas nr N a w n t s anproved ~y B u ~ r r .
'lU RISY OF In R R - Shoroid the Prrrpeny P* ma~orioliydomagsd by Or. ~r mhcr sour. p r i r~
o u l e a i n ~ ,u n l o ~ *O v r c l ~11-a

--

taken Posses*on prior t o ctosind by Agreement. this Agreement shail be voideble

at the option of 8uyer.

between the panics end no werrantles, including any warranty of habirabliity, Aerecrnonts or representations have
been made or shail be binding upon either party ,vnIess herein 6et forth.
24. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT.
28, ACCEPTANCE: Buyer's offer i, mode subject lo the acceptance of Sellcr on or before (Cat01 w . c i a , y , July 28,
2M4 end ITimv) 5:90.If Seller does nor accept t h ~ sAgreement within the timo specified, the enrire Earnest
Money shell bo refunded to B u v ~ or n demand.
~B.OTME~TERMS~
1.
7031 Fxnh&~~n,fnr horh B u ~ e ~ p n
Betlrrr,
d
bo!b-$? ?p:co~oroto.,.

hi#-f-a

kSScjlor: due a7 dos!pct.

/fi

Buyer 5lgnakro
jb/.w\/L
. .
V
d
\
Buyer
(Print
~ems)/
Iliur 4 9
-ueto
f
Tlme I
Pho%e#
Addrosa
-.
City
State

.
-

11111 # Y , T *I
~ pnmn

n n om,iou~.a

L.

Buvrr'r hitid8 I

ur inn nrm WOCIUDI~I

.

_

----.

DDENDUM IS):

.
ISpecify number of Buyer

--

8uyor Signature
Buyer (Print Name)
Obto
Addross

Time
State

br of COPY ef tnis pago.

whit
f Soilor'w lnirials (

-

Phone#
ZiP

-

PROPEarY ADDRESS: D

O Second Svem Sou&;

Narnpa Blvd. Namp-a,Ja

10 # 04-071

28. SELLER'S 5IGNATURES.
On thig deto, IiWe hereby approve and accepr the tranuaclion >;at forth :n the ebovv Agrsemenr end agros to carry
out aft tho terms thereof On the pan of ths Seller. IIWe turthor acknowledge remipr of a ,rue copy of this
Agraornont signed by both perties.

C-WE 21 revised Augusf 1999
Psge 4 ot 4

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO, VACATING lSTAVENUE,
SOUTH BEzrnSTREET SOUTH AND 3RDSTREET SOUTH IN THE CITY OF
NAMPA, CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, SUBJECT TO AN ACCESS AND UTILITY
EASEMENT RESERVED THEREON, AND ANDDIRECTING THE CITY ENGWER TO
ALTER 'l"Ht3 USE AND AREA MAP ACCORDINGLY.

Nampa was read before the City Council; and

WHEREAS, on October 2, 1995, the Second Reading of the above described
vacation Ordinance was read before tbe City Council; and
WHBREAS, on October 16, 1995, the Third Reading of the above
vacation Ordinance Was tabled by the City Council because the necessary
access tbrough the area by the Fire D e p m e n t had not been obtained; and

WHEREAS, the access and utility easement is acceptable to the Fise
Department as to location and dimension.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY 'QE MAYOR AND
COUNCZL OF TEE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO:
That lSTvenue South between zNDSkeet South and 3RDStreet
Section 1:
South in the City of Nampa, Idaho be and the same is hereby vacated, such vacation subject
to the fo110wing described access and utility easement wJich is hereby reserved on the
vacated property, to-wit:

See Exhibit A attached hereto and, by this reference, incorporated
herein as if set forth in full.
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Section 2:
That the City Engineer is hereby instructed and directed to alter
the Use and Area Map in accordance with the above Ordinance.
6th DAY OF
PASSED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO, THIS a11cp&.-, 2004.

APPROVED BY THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO, THIS
OF Auqust:
,2004.

'6thDAY

State ofIdaho )

C

mthLI /bn3dav
known
andl M4
a Notary Public, ppers
or identified to me to be the M a p and City Clerk,n~g&eIy,
of flhe C i t y w w h o
executed the imtmment oq,theperson that executedthe instmmmt on behalf ofsaid corporation,
and aoknowledgeto me,@atsuch capomtion e x d the same.

k

LEGAT., DESCRIPTION FOR
VACATION OF F R S T AVENUE SOUTH

and Third Street South

city of Nampa

i

i

-

DUROBILT

STARTERS
j

1st Ave. South

P.0. BOX 904

b

ALTERNATORS

*

REGULATORS

Nampa, Idaho 83653-0904

*

''

BATTERIES
FAX

208 1466-7023

TEL 208 1466-7614

City of Nampa, Office of the Mayor
31 1 3'* Street South
Nampa, ID 83651
September 3,2004
Attention: All Nampa City Officials

In 1995 an application was sought to vacate 1'' Avenue South in Nampa, Idaho for
development of the surrounding area. Property owners were contacted and an agreemellt
was signed clearing the way for development of the area. The original idea behind the
agreement was to transplant property owners to other properties opening this block for
future development. The idea was cleared to a certain point and then drop without being
eloper wants to resurrect the issue of vacating 1'' Avenue South,
s1
but development plans have changed dramatically. N o longer are all property o wners

has grown to where it has
v
industrial & agricultural
traffic.
Once again, I am not in favor of vacating 1'' Avenue South. To restrict this street would
cripple my business, frustrate customers and become a traffic hazard. It is my
understanding that all property owners must be in agreement on such action. I am not in
agreement. Please dismiss action on vacating Is' Avenue South.

Bart h K n i g h t
President / Owner

,'

JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J. F. RUNFT (ISB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9496
Fax: (208) 343-3246

GOODMAN O E COMPANY,
Petitioner,

1
1
)

CASE NO. CV 04-10007

1
1

VS.

This Court has duly found and adjudged that Petitioner is entitled to this
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus compelling Nampa Respondents in the above case to
publish Ordinance #3374.
Now, therefore I command that you, City of Nampa, Mayor Tom Dale and Diana
Lambing, in her capacity as City Clerk, publish Ordinance #3374 in accordance with the
PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS- Page 1
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E

applicable law and do also command that you make known to me on or before fourteen
days after the service of this writ, that you have executed this Peremptory Writ of
Mandamus.

DATED this *day

I

hoc~;~

of July, 2005.

PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS- Page 2

OOOORS

CERTWICATE OF SERVICE

8

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
day o
correct copy of the foregoing PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS was served upon
opposing counsel as follows:

A US Mail

Christopher E. Yorgason
Moore Smith
225 N. 9th, Suite 420
Boise ID 83702

-Personal Delivery
Facsimile

Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC
1020 W. Main St. Suite 400
Boise, ID 83702

-Personal Delivery
Facsimile

PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS- Page 3
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CHRISTOPHER E. YORGASON # 5844
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attomeys at Law
225 North 9th Street, Suite 420
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
Email: cev@,msbtlaw.com

OCT 1 2 2005
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
G USOG, DEPUTY

Attomeys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Plaintiff,

) Case No. CV 05-9800
)

1

V.

) ANSWER

SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
)
INC., and Idaho corporation; BART and
1
d wife; and )
ALANE MCKNIGHT,
DOES I through V.
1
)

Defendants.

& Turcke, Chartered, and by way of Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

("Complaint"), admit, deny and allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation of
the Complaint. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any

-

ANSWER 1
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and all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. Duro-Bilt, in asserting the following defenses, does not
admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is upon it,
but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of said denials, and by reason of relevant statutory and
judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many, if not all of the defenses and
affirmative defenses and the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many,
if not all, of the defenses and affirmative defenses is upon Plaintiff in this action.

11. SECOND DEFENSE
Duro-Bilt denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs Complaint not
specifically admitted in this Answer.

1.

Duro-Bilt admits the

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5.

In answer to paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits this Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
ANSWER - 2

6.

In answer to paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits that this Court has

personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in this action.
7.

In answer to paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits that venue is proper

in Canyon County.
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS

8.

In answer to paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that it entered

10.

In answer to paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the

Vacation Agreement speaks for itself.
11.

In answer to paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the

14.

In answer to paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.

-

ANSWER 3

15.

In answer to paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.
16.

In answer to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the

Purchase and Sale Agreement speaks for itself.
17.

In answer to paragraph 17 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the

20.

In answer to paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.
26.

In answer to paragraph 26 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.

-

ANSWER 4

27.

In answer to paragraph 27 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.

paragraph 29 of the Complaint.
30.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 30 of the Complaint.

3 1.

In answer to paragraph 3 1 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that it phoned

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.

-

ANSWER 5

35.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 35 of the Complaint.

36.

In answer to paragraph 36 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt adinits that it had no

discussions with Goodman regarding the vacation for several years.
37.

Durn-Bilt admits the allegations contained in paragraph 37 of the Complaint.

38.

In answer to paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits that it had no

discussions with Goodman regarding the vacation for several years.

40.

In answer to paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,
therefore, denies the same.

document speaks for itself.
VI. COUNT ONE -BREACH OF CONTRACT
44.

Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint.

45.

In answer to paragraph 45 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt denies that the Vacation

Agreement is a valid contract between Goodman and Duro-Bilt.

-

ANSWER 6

46.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 46 of the Complaint.

47.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 47 of the Complaint.

48.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 48, including subparts (a)

through (g), of the Complaint.
49.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 49 of the Complaint.

50.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 50 of the Complaint.

52.

Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint.

53.

In answer to paragraph 53 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and,

PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
57.

Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint.

58.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 58 of the Complaint.

59.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 59 of the Complaint.

60.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 60 of the Complaint.

-

ANSWER 7

61.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 61 of the Complaint.

62.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 62 of the Complaint.

K. COUNT FOUR - INTENTIONAL INTEREFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

63.

Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint.

64.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 64 of the Complaint.

68.

Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 68 of the Complaint.

X. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
69.

Goodman is estopped from raising claims for breach of contract, tortious

Duro-Bilt reserves the right, after fwrther discovery, to amend this Answer to add or
delete affirmative defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such defenses in
this Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer.

-

ANSWER 8

XI. REOUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Duro-Bilt hereby requests that it be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred herein
pursuant to all applicable Idaho law, including Sections 12-120 and 12-121 of the Idaho Code,
and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for jury Trial, DuroBilt prays that Plaintiff takes nothing by its Complaint, that the same be dismissed with

MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

By:

a(*~l-

~hrihtophey~.
Yorgason

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele@mnftlaw.com

-Overnight Mail
J Facsimile

Yorgason
~hridopher!~.
ANSWER - 9

CHRISTOPHER E. YORGASON # 5844
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1800
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIA
IDAHO, IN AND FOR T
.

GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

I

-

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
P.-SALAS, DEPUN

>
) Case No. CV 05-9800

v.

)
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
INC., and Idaho corporation; BART and
) MOTIONTO D
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; and )
DOES I through V.
)

1

,Defendants Scotty's Duro-Bilt Gen
(collectively "Duro-Bilt"), by an through their attorneys of record, Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke,
Chartered, and hereby move this Court for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and move this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Bart and
Alane McKnight in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The
pleadings on file and to be presented before decision hereon demonstrate that there is no genuine

-

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1

issue as to any material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the McKnights as
individuals. This Motion is supported by the memorandum of law and Affidavit of Christopher E.
Yorgason lodged on June 16, 2006, and the pleadings on file and any argument presented before
decision hereon. Defendants request attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code $5 12-120 and
12-121 and any other reimbursement and relief deemed appropriate by the Court.

MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that oh this 29

I

Karl J. F. RunR
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 343-3246
Email: imsteele@,ixnRlaw.com

-Overnight
Mail
Facsimile

-

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS 2

JON M.STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J, RUNFT GSB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFlCES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9495
Fax: (208) 343-324&

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AM) FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,

1
1

I

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, Goodman O
i
l Company ("Goodman") by and through their
attorney, Jon M. Steele, and pursuant to IRCP 56 moves for summary judgment on the issues of
liability of Defendants in regards to the following:
1.

Count One - Breach of Contract (the "Vahtion Agreement") as to Defendant DuroBilt.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 1
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2.

Count Two - Tortious Interference with the GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale
Agreement as to all Defendants.

3.

Count Three - Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (the
"GoodmaniWylie" sale) as to all Defendants.

Plaintiff requests a separate trial on the issue of damages.
This Motion for Summary Judgment is based upon the verified pleadings, supporting
affidavits, Memorandums and Exhibits previously filed in this case and in the case of Goodman v.
City ofNampa, a corporate bodypolitic; The City Council of the Ciry OfNampa; Mayor Tom Dale,
Diana Lambing, andScofzy's Duro-Bill Generator, Inc., Case No. CV 04-10007.

The issues of liability on each of the three causes of action are fully briefed in the Plaintiffs
Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and In
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability filed with &is Motion.
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment as there is no genuine issue of material fact and
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the liability issues as a matter of law.

By:

a
JON M. STEELE

Attorney for Plaintiff

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 2
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CERTIHCATE OF SERVICE
day of August 2006, a true and
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF
LIABILITY was served upon opposing counsel as follows:
-US Mail

Christopher Yorgason

Attorney for Plaintiff

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 3
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARI, J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9495
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele@runllaw.com

j;,z

k.
BJ
"..-,~~.fi~~r&-%?---?.M.
t,5ah

8".
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., 'i? ;ofl&
u

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE. DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
VS.

SCO'M'Y'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife;
and DOES I through V.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 05-9800
BRIEF I N RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
ISSUES OF LIABILITY

1
COMES NOW Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company ("Goodman") and r e s p ~ dto.Defendant's
s
Motion for SummaryJudgment and Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's
Motions should be summarily denied. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability should be gxanted.

BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 1

I.
INTRODUCTION
This dispute arises out of proceedings to vacate the public right-of-way known as First
Avenue South between 2ndStreet South and 31d Skeet South in Nampa.
This litigation is a spin-off of mandamus and judicial review litigation before Judge Morfltt.
See, Goodman Oil Company v. City of Nampa, The City Council ofthe City of Nampa, MCzyor Tom
Dale and Diana Lambing and Scoiiy's Duro-Bill Generator, Znc., Case No. CV 04-10007, 31d

Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho (hereafler referred to as the "Goodman Mandamus
Proceeding").

On August 8, 2005, Judge Morfitt, in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding, entered his
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus (with an IRCP 54(b) certificate) orderingNampa to publish Ordinance
No. 3374 vacating Fist Avenue South. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability, Bates Nos. 000001-000011. This mdavit

is hereafter

referred to as "See, Bates Nos. ...."
The Goodman Mandamus Proceeding also seeks judicial review of the fifty (50') foot wide
easement reserved in Ordinance No. 3374. Goodman has asked Judge Morfitt to strike the easement.
It is Goodman's contention in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding that: (1) The easement
reserved in Ordinance No. 3374 is redundant to the cross easements granted in the Vacation
Agreement; (2) the vacation statute itself (Idaho Code 9 50-3 11) reverses the appropriate easements;
(3) the easement reserved in Ordinance No. 3374 is wholly out of proportion to anyone's
interpretation of reasonable access; and, (4) the building review process (i.e. obtaining a building
permit) will provide Nampa the opportunity to review development plans and at that time require, if
BREF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 2

000052

necessary, an appropriate easement providing access to the property owners adjoining vacate First
Avenue South. See,Bates Nos. 000012-000054.
The issues have been fully briefed and oral argument is scheduled before Judge Morfitt on September
1,2006 at 1: 30 p.m. See,Bates Nos. 0000 12-000168.
The vacated street is now owned by the adjoining property owners, subject to the reserved
easement in Ordinance No. 3374.
Defendants contention that the "vacation is mired in litigation" (See, Defendants'
Memorandum, p. 12)conveniently ignores the fact that the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding and this
litigation are the result of Defendants' breach of contract, Defendant's interferencewith contractand
Defendant's role as the instigator of an illegal veto by Nampa's Mayor. This entire dispute would
never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had complied with its contractual obligations. Defendants'
contention also ignores the fact that F i t Avenue South is now vacated.
The real issue in this litigation is whether the tail will be allowed to wag the dog. Duro-Bilt,
the owner of a 2800 square foot lot, has torpedoed a 43,000 square foot development that would have
enhanced the gateway to, and a major comdor of, the City of Nampa.
Defendants' complaints boil down to nothing more thanthat Goodman, the adjoiningproperty
owners, potential developers and the City of Nampa have all failed to concede to their demands. See,
Defendants' Memorandum, p. 6.
Goodman, nor anyone else, has any intention or desire to deny Duro-Bilt access. This entire
dispute would never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had abided by the contractual terms it agreed to in the
Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (hereafter "Vacation Agreement").

BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FORY-S
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 3

FACTS

On August 2,1995, Goodman entered into the Vacation Agreement with Defendant Scotty's
Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. (hereafter "Duro-Bilt"), the Blamires Family Trust (hereafter "Blamires"),
and T. J. Forest, Inc. (hereafter "Forest"). Goodman, Duro-Bilt, the Blamires and Forest were the
owners of &property adjacent to that portion of Fist Avenue South between 2ndStreet south and 31d
Street South.

In the Vacation Agreement, the parties exchanged mutual promises consenting to Nampa's
vacation of First Avenue South. The parties granted and conveyed among themselves a perpetual
easement upon the vacated property for the purpose of access to and from their property. The parties
agreed to fully cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of the Vacation Agreement was
accomplished, and to equally share in the maintenance of the easement in proportion to the amount of
property they owned which adjoins First Avenue South. See, Bates Nos. 000038-000043.
Prior to vacation, Goodman's property consisted of over 36,800 square feet. Blamires'
property consisted of over 17,250 square feet. Forest owned 3,750 square feet. Duro-Bilt owned a
single tot of 2,850 square feet. The building on Duro-Bilt's lot covers almost the entire lot.
First Avenue South, prior to its vacation, ran north and south and was a street of eighty (80')
feet in width and three hundred (300') feet in length. The actual constructed roadway is forty (40')
feet in width, back of curb to back of curb. The easement reserved in OrdinanceNo. 3374 is over the
westerly fifty (50') feet of the vacated property. The reserved easement in o r d i c e No. 3374 is ten
(10') feet rester than the constructed roadway. This leaves only thirty (30') feet of the original

eighty (80') feet of street width unencumbered by the reserved easement and d l of that unencumbered
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 4

property is located on the west side of the vacated street.

In other words, that portion of the vacated street to the east is partially encumbered by the
easement resewed in O r d i i c e No. 3374 and that portion of the vacated street to the west is
completely encumbered by the easement resewed in Ordmance No. 3374. This encumbrance renders
15,000 square feet now owned by Goodman, Blamires, Forest and Duro-Bilt unbuildable and of little
value. See,Bates No. 000246.
Goodman owns property on both sides of the vacated street. Lots 7,8,9,11 and 12(each fifty
(50') feet in width) are located on the west side of the vacated street. Lots 4,5 and 6 (each fiRy (50')
feet in width) are located on the east side of the vacated street.
Duro-Bilt is the owner of Lot 10 located on the west side of the vacated street. Lot 10 is
bordered by Goodman property to the north (Zot 1 1) to the south (Zot 9), and following vacation of
First Avenue South, to the east.
Defendant Bart McKnight is the president and owner of Duro-Bilt. Defendant Alane
McKnight is Bart McKnight's wife. Defendants Bart and Alane McKnight will hereafter be referred
to as "McKnight".
On August 3, 1995, Goodman submitted an application to Nampa for vacation of Fist
Avenue South. See,Bates No. 000044. On August 24,1995, Mr. Holm, Nampa Planning Director,
prepared a Staff Report. The Staff Report lists the applicant as the adjoining property owners,
Goodman, Duro-Bilt, Blamires, and Forest. See,Bates No. 000045. On September 5,1995, apublic
hearing was held and the Nampa City Council (hereafter "Council") approved the vacation of First
Avenue South between 2nd Street South and 3rd Street South See, Bates No. 000098. On
September 18,1995, the first reading of the O r d i i c e vacating First Avenue South was completed by
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 5

oooqP5g;
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the Council. See, Bates Nos. 000101-000102. On October 2, 1995, the second reading of the
Ordinance was completed by the Council. See,Bates No. 000110. On October 16,1995, the third
reading of the O r d i i c e was tabled because the issue of fire department access had not been
resolved. See,Bates No. 0001 17. This Ordinance did not reserve an easement. See,Bates No.

In this Ordinance the legal description of the property to be vacated read as follows:
The portion of 1" Avenue South between Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants
Addition to Nampa as shown on the official plat thereof on file in the office
of the Canyon County Recorder in Book 4 of Plats at Page 10, located from
the Southwesterlyright-of-way of 2"dStreet South to the Northeasterly rightof-way of 31d Street South.

In 1999 and 2001, Goodman inquired of Nampa regarding the status of the vacation of First
Avenue South. Planning Director.Holm confirmed that the vacation of First Avenue South had been
approved by the Council on September 5,1995.

In letters dated September 6, 1995, March 1, 1999, and May 29, 2001, Planning Director
Holm stated that "once a plan for development of the site has been prepared, presented to, and
approved by the F i e [Dlepartment I will request the City Council take the matter of the street
vacation off the table and complete their action vacating the street." See,Bates Nos. 000240-242.
The vacation application never lapsed.
On July 28, 2004, Goodman and James R Wylie (Wylie) signed a Purchase and Sale

Agreement whereby Goodman agreed to sell its property. The sale price was Six Hundred Thousand
($600,000) Dollars to be paid in cash at closing. The only contingency was completing the vacation
of First Avenue South in a manner acceptable to Goodman and Wylie. See,Bates Nos. 000203-
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In August of 2004, Goodman and Wylie informed Defendants of this sale and that the sale
was contingent upon the successful vacation of Fist Avenue South. See, Bates No. 000178.
On August 4,2004, the Nampa Fire Department provided written conditional approval of
development plans for the vacated property and the property owned by Goodman. See, Bates Nos.
000046 and 000179. The development plans had been submitted by Wylie. The Nampa F i e
Department approved the vacation of Fist Avenue South subject to a dedicated twenty (20) foot wide
fire apparatus access road. The F i e Department also requested Wylie to obtain the consent, once
again, of the adjoining property owners. See, Bates No. 000046.
Both Goodman and Wiley informed Duro-Bilt and McKnight of the pending sale.

to

entering into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Wylie, Goodman through Mr. Conley, its
president (hereafter "Conley") called McKnight at his place of business and offered to sell the
Goodman property to McKnight on the exact same terms as made available to Wylie. After signing
the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement, Wylie visited McKnight 3 or4 times during July
and August of 2004. Wylie told McKnight about the pending sale and the need to complete the street
vacation. Both Conley and Wylie will testify that Defendants had knowledge of the Goodman/Wylie
Purchase and Sale Agreement and that Defendants knew that the transaction was contingent upon the
successful vacation of F i Avenue South. Wylie asked Duro-Bilt to sign the consent requested by
the F i e Department. Wylie will testify that McKnight agreed to sign the consent form presented to
him after the other property owners signed. After Wylie obtained the consent of the other property
owners, he returned to McKnight's place of business to obtain his consent. McKnight and Duro-Bilt
then refused their consent. See, Bates Nos. 000178-000179.
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On August 16,2004, the vacation ordinance ("Ordinance No. 3374") was approved by the
Council and the Mayor. See, Bates Nos. 000207-000208. However, this was not the Ordinance
passed by the Council in 1995. At the August 16,2004 Council meeting, with no prior notice the
Council was presented and passed an entirely new ordinance after suspending the rules. The new
Ordinance reserved a fifty (50') foot wide easement that had not been included in the original
Ordinance. See, Bates Nos. 000207-000208. The Ordinance reserved a fifty (50') foot easement
despite the fact that the Nampa Fire Department had only requested a twenty (20') foot wide
easement.
OrdinanceNo. 3374 was identical to the Ordinance passed by the Council in 1995 except the
phrase "...SUBJECT TO AN ACCESS AND UTILITY EASEMEXT RESERVED TEREON.. ."
had been added to the title and the reserved easement was added to the legal description. See, Bates
No. 000207.

In discoveiy, Goodman was surprised to learn that Defendants had instigatedthe veto through
exparte contacts with the Mayor.
McKnight's efforts to interdict OrdinanceNo. 3374 began with speaking to a Nampa City
Clerk and telling the City Clerk he no longer consented to the vacation of First Avenue South and
wished to prevent OrdinanceNo. 3374 fkom going into effect. The City Clerk directed McKnight to
call the City Attorney, Mr. White. McKnight called the City Attorney that same day and voiced his
objections to Ordinance No. 3374. McKnight was told by Mr. White that, "they could withdraw this
if I talked to the mayor." McKnight then, again that same day, called Nampa City Hall, spoke to
Mayor Dale, and explained his objection to the vacation. Mayor Dale agreed to veto Ordinance No.

3374. McKnight specifically recalled this exchange in his deposition testimony: "I asked him [the
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Mayor] if there was a way to pull this off of being published, and he said, 'Yes, I can veto it."' See,
Bates Nos. 000180-000181.
An e-mail dated August 19,2004, from the City Clerk, Diana Lambing, had the following
message to Cris Luna and Deborah Bishop, deputy clerks at the Nampa City Clerks office:
Hi Kids!
Just a little note to let you know that at the Mayor and Terry White's direction,
I pulled this Ordinance for Vacation of Fist Avenue South from being
published. One of the property owners is not in agreement anymore. So it is
on hold until M e r notice.
Thanks.

See, Bates Nos. 000179-000180.
On ~ e ~ t e m b2nd,
e r Mayor Dale vetoed OrdinanceNo. 3374. See,Bates Nos. 000180-000181.
It was Mayor Dale's only veto since the beginning of his term. This is the only veto seen by Planning
Director Holm in his 27 years with the City. See, Bates No. 000180. The veto was instigated by
Defendants.
McKnight's objection to Ordinance No. 3374 was aided by the fact he is a friend of Mayor
Dale. McKnight and the Mayor have participated in civic activities and events. McKnight and the
Mayor have mutual friends, specifically Council member Thome. It was Thorne who at the August
14,2005 Council meeting, moved that Ordinance No. 3374 be passed under suspension of the rules.

See, Bates No. 000180.
McKnight, Thome and the Mayor had been on a ski trip together to Sun Valley in March of
2004. Mayor Dale describes McKnight as a friend. See, Bates No. 000180.

In his deposition, Mayor Dale confiied McKnight's material, ex parte contact, recalling
that "he [McKnight] conveyed to me that, as a property owner on that street, he did not agree to the
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vacation at this time." Concerning his decision to veto Ordinance No. 3374, the Mayor stated:
[Olne of the ways of dealing with this was with avcto. Another way was to
bring it back before city council. Because, since the ordinance had not been
published, it had not become law at this time. And the city council could
have brought it back and reconsidered it and voted on it. It was my decision
that the most expedient way to do it was through the veto.

See, Bates No. 000181.
Once learning of Mayor Dale's veto, Conley visited McKnight at his place of business.
McKnight said he didn't like Wylie and that he (McKnight) wanted to purchase the Goodman lots
which adjoined his property to the south, the one withthe car lot. Goodman immediately mote to the
Mayor and Council in an effort to save the transaction with Wylie. The sale closing date was
extended to October 1,2004. See,Bates No. 000217. Goodman argued to the Mayor and Council on
~ e ~ t e m b2e r0 that
~ the Mayor did not have authority to veto Ordinance No. 3374. Goodman wrote
to the Mayor and Council on three (3) separate occasions, explaining that the Mayor's veto would
seriouslyjeopardize Goodman's transaction with Wylie. Goodman told the Mayor and Council that
it would file a Petition for Writ of Mandate if the City refused to amend and publish OrdinanceNo.

3374. The Mayor and Council refused to override the Mayor'sveto. See, BatesNos. 000181-000182.
Goodman's transaction with Wylie failed by reason that the vacation had not been completed
in an acceptable manner. See, Bates No. 000182.
Goodmanthen filed its Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and for Judicial Review of Ordinance
No. 3374. See, Bates No. 000182.
Planning Director Holm stated in his deposition, that all that was required from the adjoining
owners to effect a vacation was a simple note establishing that all adjoining landowners had
consented. Holm also testified thatthe Vacation Ageement, signed by Duro-Bilt, was more formal
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and detailed than the usual consents received for street vacations. See.Bates No. 000177.
Holm knows of no source of authority allowing the Nampa F i e Department to request an
access easement be reserved in a street vacation ordinance. See,Bates No. 000178.
Holm also has no expectation that a detailed easement would be submitted to the City of
Nampa until such time as the property owner or developer seeks a building permit. See,Bates No.
000178.
This is standard practice in the development of a commercial site. The actual description of
an easement is not finalized until such time as the site requirements are determined. The owner and
designer must have some flexibility in designing buildings and providing for access, but yet comply
with local standards. The building review process provides the City of Nampa with the opportunity
to review development plans and at that time to establish, if necessary, appropriate easements. The
Nampa Fire Department, as a consulting agency, has the opportunity to review and comment on
development plans when they are submitted. But they have no statutory authority over a street
vacation or the issuance of a building permit.
This Complaint alleging breach of the Vacation Agreement by Duro-Bilt, tortious
interference with the GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement by all Defendants, negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage (the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale
Agreement) by all Defendants and intentional interferencewith prospective economic advantage (the
Goodman/WyliePurchase and Sale Agreement) by all Defendants was filedon September 19,2005.
Goodman's damages include, but are not limited to, the difference between the value of
Goodman's real property in August 2004 and the now reduced fair market value of the Goodman
property. See,Bates No. 000246. The GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement would have
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closed absent Duro-Bilt's breach of the Vacation Agreement and Defendant's interference.
Goodman's damages also include attorney fees and costs incurred. See, Ray1 v. Shull Enterprises,
Znc., 108 Idaho 524,700 P.2d 567 (1984) (attorney fees allowed as special damages)

The damages incurred by Goodman are dependent upon the result of judicial review
proceedings before Judge Morfitt.

Ill.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court must liberally construe the f%ts in the
existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1994).
Summaryjudgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d
360,364 (1991). If there are conflicting inferences arising from the record or reasonable minds might
reach different conclusions, summaryjudgment must be denied on those points of difference. Bonz

v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991).

AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAILS

Duro-Bilt contends (a) that there is no valid contract between the parties @. 12 Defendants'
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Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); @) that the Vacation
Agreement lapsed due to failure of the vacation (page 12, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (c) that the Vacation Agreement did not contain a
contract term and therefore should be deemed to have lapsed (page 13, Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (d) that the Vacation Agreement is invalid
for lack of consideration(page 15, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment); (e) that even if the Vacation Agreement is valid, Duro-Biit is excused fiom
performance (page 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment); (f) that Duro-Bilt has acted faitly and in good faith (page 17, Defendants' Memorandum
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); and (g) that Goodman has breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing (page 19, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment).
As a matter of law, each of these contentions fails. "The objective in interpreting contracts
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties." Twin Lakes Village Property Ass'n v.
Aune, 124Idaho 132,135,857 P.2d 611,614 (1993). The intent ofthe parties should, ifpossible, be

ascertained fkom the language of the contract. Id See also, Hogan v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274,279,
25 1 P.2d 209,2 13 (1952). "The scope of ...[the court's] inquiry into the parties' intent is limited
however, by the general rule that if a deed is plain and unambiguous the parties intent must be
ascertained only fkom the deed itself, par01 evidence being inadmissible for that purpose." Phillips
Industries, Znc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693,697,827 P.2d 706,710 (1992) (citing Gardner v. Fleigel,

92 Idaho 767,770-71,450 P.2d 990,993-94 (1969)).
Questions of contract interpretation and enforcement are normally the sole province of the
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courts. See, A$on Energy, Znc. v. Idaho Power Co., 122 Idaho 333,337,834 P.2d 850 854 (1992).
Interpretation and legal effect of an unambiguous contract are questions of law over which this Court
exercises free review. See, Hanks v. Sawtelle Rentals, Znc., 133 Idaho 199,202-03,984 P.2d 122,
125-26 (1999); FirstSecuriiy BankofIdaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 131Idaho 787,791,964 P.2d 654,658
(1998). In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as a whole and give meaning
to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. See, Magic ValleyRadiology Assoc., P.A. v.
Prfl Business Servs., 119 Idaho 558,565,808 P.2d 1303,1310 (1991).
Both Goodman and Duro-Bilt agree that the interpretation of the Vacation Agreement is a
matter of law (page 12, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants:' Motion for Summary
Judgment). Each of Duro-Bilt's contentions are addressed below.
a. The Vacation Agreement is a Valid Contract.

Defendants' various contentions concede the existence of a contract between Goodman and
Duro-Bilt. There must first be a contract before it can lapse or be otherwise unenforceable.
The plain language of the Vacation Agreement establishes a contract between Goodman and
Duro-Bilt.
The Vacation Agreement provides the following:

...the parties, for good and valuable consideration the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, agree as follows:
That the parties consent to the City of Nampa's vacation of First
1.
Avenue South, located between Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition
abovedescribed, as a public right-of-way as depicted on exhibit "A" attached
hereto.
That the parties grant and convey among themselves, their agents,
2.
licensees, and assignees a perpetual easement upon vacated First Avenue
South for the purpose of access to and from their property &om both Second
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and Third Street located in Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho. The actual
location of the easement shall be at the discretion of the legal owner of the
vacated property upon the City's vacation of First Avenue South as described
herein.
3.
That the parties shall fully cooperate to ensure that the purpose and
intent of this Agreement shall be accomplished. The parties shall execute a
formalized agreement recognizing the rights and obligations of the parties
upon the City of Nampa's vacation of Fist Avenue South as described
herein. The parties shall equally share in the maintenance of said easement in
proportion to the amount of property they own which adjoins First Avenue
South as described herein.
4.
That the parties shall hold each other harmless and indemnify the
other parties from their negligent act and that of their agents in maintaining
and using said access easement.
5.
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
parties and their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal
representatives.

See, Bates Nos. 000038-000040.
The burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff,
and once those facts are established, the defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative
defenses which legally excuse performance. See, 0 'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,8 13,810 P.2d

The existence of a contract between Goodman and Duro-Bilt cannot be seriously disputed.
b. The Vacation Agreement did not Lapse due to Failure of the Vacation.

Defendant's contention is that without a street vacation, there is no contract. See, p. 12,
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This
contention ignores the fact that F i t Avenue South is now vacated. Judge Morfitt's Order Granting
Writ of Mandamus was a final appealable Order and included a 54(b) certificate. See, Bates Nos.
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000001-000002. Neither the City of Nampa nor Duro-Bilt appealed.
Consent of all adjoining property owner's is a pre-requisite to a vacation proceeding. Idaho
Code F) 50-1321. The only Duro-Bilt consent provided to the Nampa Planning Director, to the
Nampa Council and to Judge Morftt was the Vacation Agreement. No one but Defendants believes
consent is an issue.
The issue of Duro-Bilt's consent has beenjudicially resolved by Judge Morfitt and Duro-Bilt
is estopped from contending otherwise.
Duro-Bilt was named as a Respondent in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding. Despite
Goodman's contention that Duro-Bilt was an indispensableparty, Judge Morfitt granted Duro-Bilt's
Motion to Dismiss.
In the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding, Goodman, in opposing Duro-Bilt's dismissal,

contended that Duro-Bilt had a significantproperty interest to protect. Duro-Bilt acquired ownership
of an additional 2,000 square feet upon vacation of First Avenue South. Duro-Bilt also bad an
interest in prese~ingits existing utility and access easements or participating in revising the
description of access and utility easements as reserved in the Ordinance. See, Bates No. 000255 to

000265.
Duro-Bilt elected to abandon the opportunity to contest its consent and the enforceability of
the Vacation Agreement.
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars Duro-Bilt from now raising the issue of consent and the
enforceability of the Vacation Agreement. The rule of claim preclusion is that "in an action between
the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and
privies not only as to every matter offered arid received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to
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every matter which might and should have been litigated in the fist suit." Wove v. Farm Bureau

Insurance Co., 128Idaho 398,402,913 P.2d 1168,1172(1996), citing Magic ValleyRadiology, P.A.
v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,436-37,849 P.2d 107,109-110 (1993).
Duro-Bilt's claims concerning consent and the validity of the Vacation Agreement were
resolved by the vacation of First Avenue South. Claim preclusion serves three fundamental
purposes. "Fist, it ipreserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive
disrespect that would follow if the same manner were litigated to inconsistent results. Second, it
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and
third, it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims." Aldape v.

Akins, 105 Idaho 254,257,668 P.2d 130,133 (1983) ( i t e d citation omitted).
Quasi-estoppel also precludes Duro-Bilt from asserting the failure of the Vacation Agreement
and absence of consent.
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is properly invoked against a person asserting a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to
the detriment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine. Treasure ValleyBankv. Butcher, 121Idaho

53 1, 826 P.2d 492 (1992). The applicability of quasi-estoppel turns upon the specific facts and
circumstances of the case under consideration. See, KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,486 P.2d
992 (1971). Quasi-estoppel does not require misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the
other. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372, 378 (1998). Duro-Bilt is
estopped to deny its consent to vacation and the validity of the Vacation Agreement.
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c. The Vacation Agreement has not Lapsed for Failure to Include a Term for Performance.
Defendants' contention ignores the self executing language of the Vacation Agreemenl: The
parties to the Vacation Agreement "...grant and convey among themselves.. .a perpetual easement
upon the vacated Fist Avenue South for the purpose of access to and from their property from both
Second and Third Street located in Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho."
A grant of a perpetual easement is not unusual. See, Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners, et a1

v. Garfeld Bay Resort, Znc., 139Idaho 699,701,85 P.3d 675,677 (2004) ("...the owner intended to
grant a perpetual easement.. ."); Mountainview Landowners CooperativeAssociation, Inc., et a1 v.
Cool, 136 P.3d 332, 334 (2006) ("...[a] perpetual easement is granted to the grantees...") on
rehearing ("the grant in this case was only of a perpetual easement.")
The Vacation Agreement is a conveyance of an interest in real property. See, Idaho Code 9
55-601.
The use of the word "grant" in the Vacation Agreement has significant legal effect. The
word "grant" carries with it statutory covenants. Idaho Code 9 55-612 states in relevant part that:
From the use of the word 'grant' in any conveyance... the following
covenants.. . are implied, unless restrained by express terms contained in such
conveyance:
1. That previous to the time of the execution of such conveyance, the grantor
has not conveyed the same estate, or any~.
right, title or interest therein, to any
person other than the grantee.

2. That such estate is at the time of the execution.. .free &om encumbrances
done, made or suffered by the grantor, or any person claiming under him.
Such covenants may be sued upon in the same manner as if they had been
expressly inserted in the conveyance.
Idaho Code 9 55-606 provides that "[elvery grant or conveyance of an estate in real property
is conclusive against the grantor."
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Duro-Bilt is conclusively bound by the Vacation Agreement. The term of the Vacation
Agreement is perpetual.
d. Defendant's Contention That the Vacation Agreement is Invalid for Lack of Consideration
Fails as a Matter of Law.

Duro-Bilt's contention that the Vacation Agreement fails for lack of consideration is based
upon Duro-Bilt's expectation of a development incentive. See, p. 14 Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
This contention fails as a matter of law. Duro-Bilt bears the burden of proof in showing a
want of consideration. Idaho Code 8 29-104.

In interpreting a contract, the primary function of the court is to seek and carry out the intent
of the parties. See, Hogan v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274,279,251 P.2d 209,213 (1952). "The scope of

...[the court's] inquiry into the parties' intent is limited, however, by the general rule that if adeed is
plain and unaxnbiguous the parties' intent must be ascertained only from the deed itself, parol
evidence being inadmissible for that purpose." Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693,
697,827 P.2d 706,710 (1992) (citing Gardner v. Fleigel, 92 Idaho 767,450 P.2d 990 (1969)).
The consideration clause of the Vacation Agreement binds Dwo-Bilt. Hall v. Hall, 116
Idaho 483,484,777 P.2d 255,265 (1989) ("Where as here, the consideration clause clearly recites
that the transfer was made 'For Value Received", parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the
deed.. ..").
Defendants contend that they received no consideration for entering into the Vacation
Agreement. In fact, Defendants received the substantial consideration and benefit of a perpetual
access easement from three adjoining'property owners.
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The term "easement" may be said broadly to be a privilege which the owner of one tenement
has a right to enjoy over the tenement of another; a right which one person has to use the land of
another for a specific purpose, or a servitude imposed as a burden upon land. 17AAm. Jur. 616, Ej 1.
The following definition is contained in Black's Law Dictiomy, Fourth Edition, p. 599:
Easement. A right in the owner of one parcel of land, by reason of such
ownership, to use the land of another for a special purpose not inconsistent
with a general property in the owner. Hollomon v. Board of Education of
Stewart Counry, 168 Ga. 359, 147 S.E. 882,884; Frye v. Sibbitt, 145 Neb.
600,17 N.W.2d 617,621.
Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514,520,365 P.2d 952,955 (1961).
The consideration clause of the Agreement bars Defendants' contentions that they received
no consideration for entering into the Vacation Agreement. Additionally, the granting of cross
easements for access is real and substantial consideration.

e. Duro-Bilt is not Excused From Performance.
Duro-Bilt fails to cite any legal authority for this contention. Duro-Bilt's argument is that
Goodman has been unwilling to consider other options and enter into adiscussion. Essentially DuroBilt's complaints are that no one has volunteered to give Duro-Bilt a new building and to move the
Duro-Bilt business at no cost. In his deposition, McKnight testified as follows:
Q. Just to sort of sum things up, is it fair to say that the street vacation
agreement is satisfactoty to you if a developer were to come in and gjve you a
new building at no cost and move you to that new location?
A. It was-

MR. HALLAM: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: It was in 1995.
Q. BY MR. STEELE: Is it different now?
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A. Yes.

Q. How is it different now?
A. Well, my business has gown. I now would just have to weigh the
options. I'm nine years older.

Q. So if a developer came to you now and said, "Mr. McKnight, we're going
to move you at no cost to you and give you a new building," you wouldn't
agree to that?

MR. HALLAM: Objection, incomplete hypothetical.
MR. YORGASON: Objection.

THFi WITNESS: I would entertain the option.

Q. So you can't really give me any conditions or terms under which you
would agree to vacation of the street in front of your building - - in front of
your business?
A. If you laid a proposal in front of me, I would take some time to look at it.
See, Bates No. 000253. See also, Yorgason Affidavit, p. 2.

f. Duro-Bilt Contends That it has Acted Fair$ and in Good Faith and That Goodman has
Breached its Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the
Vacation Agreement. See, First Security BankofIdaho v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172,176,765 P.2d 683,
687 (1988); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298,300,766 P.2d 768,770 (1988) (The
covenant requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreemen%
and a violation of the covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs
any benefit of the contract. See, Idaho First Nut. Bank v. Bliss ValleyFoods, Znc., 121 Idaho 266,
289,824 P.2d 841,863 (1991). See also, Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas. Co., 116 Idaho 622,627,
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778 P.2d 744,749 (1989).
Defendants fail to cite the Court to any facts that Goodman has violated the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Defendant's contention that it has acted fairly and in good faith finds no
support in the facts of this case.

v.
GOODMAN IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF
DURO-BET'S LIABJLITY FOR BREACH OF THE VACATION AGREEMENT

Duro-Bilt has breached the Vacation Agreement's covenants by withdrawing its consent and
improperly instigatingthe veto (a breach of para. 1 of the Vacation Agreement); by denyingthe grant
of the perpetual easement (a breach of para. 2 of the Vacation Agreement); by failing to fully
cooperateto ensure that the purpose and intent of the Agreement is accomplished (a breach of para. 3
of the Vacation Agreement); by its contentions that the Vacation Agreement has failed ( a breach of
para. 5 of the Vacation Agreement); and by its breach of the covenant of good faith and f& dealings.
A breach of contract is non-performance of a contractual duty. See, Enterprise, Inc. v.
Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 740,536 P.2d 729, 735 (1975) (quoting Restatement of the Law of
Contracts 9 312 (1932)). It is a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise, which forms
the whole or part of acontract. See, Hughes v. Idaho State University, 122Idaho 435,437,835 P.2d
670,672 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 188 (6&ed. 1990)).
The existence of the contract (see, page 14 above) and Duro-Bilt's breach are established
beyond dispute. It is an undisputed fact that Defendants intended to stop the progress of the
vacation. McKnight testified as follows: "Well, if it's stopping progress of the vacation, then that's
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUh4MARY JUDGMENT AND
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okay with me." See, Bates No. 000251.
Duro-Bilt's conduct not only breached its duties under the Vacation Agreement but the same
conduct resulted in killing the GoodmanNirylie Purchase and Sale Agreement.
The facts of Duro-Bilt's breach of the Vacation Agreement are amply set forth above. There
is no genuine issue as to these essential and uncontroverted facts:
1. The Vacation Agreement is valid and enforceable.
2. In July and August 2004, Duro-Bilt refused to cooperate and consent to the vacation

procedure in breach of the Vacation Agreement covenants.
3. Despite Duro-Bilt's refusal to consent and cooperate, Ordinance No. 3374 vacating the

street was passed and approved.
4. Duo-Bilt (through McKnight) was the instigator of the illegal veto of

No.

3374.

5. Duro-Bilt, to this day, contends it has not consented, still refuses to cooperate in the
vacation of the street, and refuses to recognize the validity of the Vacation Agreement.
Both parties agree that the Vacation Agreement is not ambiguous and that its interpretation
is a matter of law.
The language of the Vacation Agreement is plain and clear. Duro-Bilt's various contentions
are without merit. Duro-Bilt's unsubstantiated allegations of developer promises are no where
mentioned in the Vacation Agreement and are inadmissible by reason of the par01 evidence rule.

See, page 19 above. Duro-Bilt's contention that the Vacation Agreement lacks consideration is
without merit as a matter of law. See,page 19 above. Finally, Duro-Bilt is estopped, as a matter of
law, from contesting its consent and the validity of the Vacation Agreement. See,page 16 and 17
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above.
Duro-Bilt's conduct, in addition to a breach of the express covenants of the Vacation
Agreement, also breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This duty obligated Duro-Bilt
to cooperate with the other parties to the Vacation Agreement so that each could obtain the full
benefit of performance.
A violation of the covenant occurs when a party violates, nullifies or significantlyimpairs any
benefit of the contract. Sorensen v. Comm. Tels, Inc., 118 Idaho 664,669,799 P.2d 70,75 (1990).
The duty and breach of this covenant have been established.
Considering the entirety of the Vacation Agreement, giving meaning to all provisions of the
Agreement, considering the undisputed facts and the application of law, Goodman is entitled to
Summaly Judgment on the issue of Duro-Bilt's breach of the Vacation Agreement.

VI.
GOODMAN IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANTS FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE
GOODMANAVYLIE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
A prima facie case of tortious interference with a contract exists where aplaintiff establishes:

(a) the existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on part of the defendant, (c) intentional
interference causing breach of the contract and (d) injury to the plainWresulting &om the breach.
Barlow v. Int '1Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,893,522 P.2d 1102,1115 (1974). See also, Thirsty's
LLC v. Tolerico, 137 P.3d 435 (2006).

Goodman contends that it is an undisputed fact that the Goodmanlwylie Purchase and Sale
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Agreement existed. It is also an undisputed fact that this contract had a single contingency - the
vacation of First Avenue South in an acceptable manner. Prior to entering into the Purchase and Sale
Agreement with Wylie, Goodman offered to sell its property to Defendants on the same exact terms.

See, Bates Nos. 000178.
It is an undisputed fact that Duro-Bilt and McKnight knew of the sale of the Goodman
property to Wylie. Both Conley and Wylie will testify that they told Duro-Bilt and McKnight of the
sale and of the contingency. See, Bates Nos. 000178-000179.
Both Duro-Bilt and McKnight admit that they met with Wylie and were asked to sign a
consent to the vacation. See, Bates Nos. 000250-000251. According to McKnight, Wylie visited
him at his business 3 or 4 times. See,Bates Nos. 000250-000251. Wylie asked Duro-BiltJMcKnight

to sign the consent form requested by the Nampa Fire Department. See, Bates No. 000251.
McKnight learned of the sale in August of 2004. See,Bates No. 000251. Wylie left Conceptual Site
Plans with McKnight/Duro-Bit. See, Bates No. 000252.
It is an undisputed fact that McKnight/Duro-Biltintended to stop the progress of the vacation
which resulted in the failure of the GoodmadWyEe transaction. See, Bates No. 000251.
After the Ordinance had been vetoed, McKnight told Goodman that he wished to purchase
Goodman's property where the car lot is located. See,Bates No. 000181. These lots are # 11 and 12
and are located to the south of Duro-Bilt's lot.
It is also an undisputed fact that Goodman has suffered an injury as a result of the reduced
value of the Goodman property. See, Bates Nos. 000246-000247.
The knowledge element of the tort is "satisfied by actual knowledge of the prospective
[economic advantage] or by knowledge of fiictswhich would lead areasonable person to believe that
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such interest exists." Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 87 Haw. 394,957 P.2d 1076, 1088 11.16 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1998) (quoting W. P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton and P. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the

Law of Torts § 129 at 982 (5* ed. 1984) cited in, Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho
330,338,986 P.2d 996,1004 (Idaho 1999).
Proof of actual knowledge is not required. It cannot be disputed that Defendants had either
actual knowledge of the sale or had knowledge of sufficient facts which would lead a reasonable
person to believe the GoodmadWylie sale existed.
Goodman is entitled to summaryjudgment on the issue of liability of Defendants for tortious
interference with the GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement.
Defendants have asserted no defense of privilege or justification. See, Walker v, Idaho Fist
National Bank, 121 Idaho 255,824 P.2d 841 (1991).

VII.
GOODMAN IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF
DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY FOR INTERFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
Under Idaho law, tortious interferencewith contractual relations is a distinct and independent
tort from tortious interferencewith prospective economic advantage, and each has its own elements.
Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co. 95 Idaho 881,893-95,522 P.2d 1102,1114-16 (1974). Idaho First
Nut? Bank v. Bliss ValleyFoods, 121 Idaho 266,283-84,824 P.2d 841 (1991). For discussion of

these tort claims, see, Downey Clinic v. Nampa Restaurant Corp., 127 Idaho 283,285-86,900 P.2d
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The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Zdaho First National Bankv. Bliss Valley, 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991).
The elements of the tort are:
(1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing
termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference was wrongfid by some
measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the defendant
interfered for an improper purpose of improper means) and (5) resulting
damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.
Highland Enterprises, Znc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,986 P.2d 996 (1999).
The torts of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage and intentional
interference with contract are very similar, differing only in the type of economic relationship with
which the defendant has interfered. See, Highland Enterprises, Znc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,339,

Goodman's burden of proof is to show that the interference was wrong. "Wrongfulness" of
the Defendants actions can be shown by either:
1. That the Defendants had an improper objective or purpose to harm Goodman.
2. That the Defendants used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective
business relationship.
See, Please v. City ofSeattle, 112 Wash.2d 794,774 P.2d 1158(1989) and, TopService Body
Shop, Znc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Ore. 201,582 P.2d 1365 (1978), cited in Walker v. The Zdaho
First National Bank, 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991).
The undisputed facts in this case satisfyboth defintions of'wrongfulness." Defendants own
testimony is that McKnight intended to stop the progress of the vacation (See, Bates No. 000251),
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an improper objective, considering Duro-Bilt's consent and agreementto the vacation. Defendant's
conduct in refusing his cooperation, withdrawing consent and breaching the Vacation Agreement
all constitute "wrongful means." Defendant's instigation of an illegal veto by the Nampa Mayor is
also a ''wrongful means."
Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability of Defendants for
interference with prospective economic advantage.
Defendants have neither pled nor alleged a defense of privilege or justification. See, Barlow
v. International Harvester Co.,95 Idaho 884,893,522 P.2d 1102,1114(1974) (quoting Restatement

of Torts 5 767 cmt. (a) (1939)).

m.
CONCLUSION
In August of 2004 a unique opportunity was presented to the City of Nampa and the property
owners adjoining First Avenue South. An experienced developer was willing to invest his time,
effort and capital into a development that would have enhanced the gateway to Nampa. Duro-Bilt
and McKnight killed that opportunity. It may be years before that opportunity presents itself again.
Duo-Bilt, although contractually bound to cooperate and having already consented to the
street vacation, broke its promises. The result is the one Defendants intended and had hoped to
achieve. Defendants are directly responsible for torpedoing a development that would have
enhanced the gateway to Nampa.
Defendants now must bear responsibility for their ill conceived choices and conduct of
August 2004. Defendant's motions should be summarily denied.
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Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on the issues of liability. The issue of damages
will be addressed at trial.
DA'IED this -day of August 2006.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
JON M. STEELE

By:
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
d y of August 2006, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY was
served upon opposing counsel as follows:
Christopher Yorgason
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702

yE:$

Delivery
-Facsimile

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
JON M. STEELE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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SUSAN E. BUXTON # 4041
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1800
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

1
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,

)

1
Plaintiff,

) Case No. CV 05-9800
)

v.

1

SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
INC., and Idaho corporation; BART and
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; and
DOES I through V.

) ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF BART
) AND ALANE MCKNIGHT
)
)
)

1
Defendants.

)

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Bart and Alane McKnight pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and having reviewed the relevant pleadings, briefs and
memoranda, and having considered oral argument, and good cause appearing therefore:
It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff has not shown that the Court should pierce the
corporate veil and hold Bart and Alane McKnight personally liable for Plaintiffs allegations
against Scotty's Duro-Bilk Generator, Inc.; and, therefore Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon

-
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"'

which relief can be granted against Bart and Alane McKnight; and
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial against
Bart and Alane McKnight, is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with costs and attorneys fees to be
addressed separately.

SEP 1 9 ?On6
DATED this -day

of September, 2006.

By:
District Judge, Third ~udiciai~istrict
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"'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -day of September, 2006, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

%

Jon M. Steele
Karl J. F. Runft
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele@runfflaw.com

-U.S. Mail
H a n d Delivery
-Overnight Mail
-Facsimile

Tammy A. Zokan
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 33 1- 1202
Email: taz@,msbtlaw.com

-U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

-
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9495
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele~runftlaw.com

P.M

-A.M.

K T 0 4 2006
'>ANYON COUNTY CLERK
'CRAWFORD, DEPUW

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,

)

1

Plaintiff,
VS.

SCOT'TY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife;
and DOES I through V.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 05-9800

GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
DISMISSING BART AND ALANE
MCKNIGHT INDIVLDUALLY

1
1
)

1
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company by and through its counsel of
record, Runft & Steele Law OfEces, PLLC, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) moves
this Court to reconsider its rulings that Defendants Bart and Alane McKnight are entitled
to dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12@)6.
This Motion is based upon a Brief in Support of this Motion and Affidavit of Jon
M. Steele.
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING
BART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY - Page 1
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Oral argument is requested.

itn
DATED this 4 2 day of October, 2006.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
JON M. STEELE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
day of October 2006, a true and
v the foreeoine GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
correct c o ~ of
OF ORDER DISMIS'NGIBART
AND ALANE MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY
was served upon opposing counsel as follows:
T m y Zokan
Moore Smith Baxton & Turke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702

US Mail
Personal Delivery
-Facsimile
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
By:
Attorney for Plaintiff
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9495
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele~m~law.com

F I .M.~ L f3P.M.
~ F ~
QCT o 4 2006

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
VS.

SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife;
and DOES I through V.
Defendants.

)

1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 05-9800
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
DISMISSING BART AND ALANE
MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY

Goodman respectfully request this Court to reconsider its Order dismissing
McKnight individually. Goodman's Complaint alleges breach of the Property Owner's
Vacation Agreement by Duro-Bilt; tortious interference with the Goodman1 Wylie
Purchase and Sale Agreement by gJl Defendants; negligent interference with prospective
economic advantage (the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement) by &
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
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Defendants; and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (the
Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement) by

Defendants.

Paragraph 3 of Goodman's Complaint alleges that "...Defendant's McKnight were
the alter egos of Defendant Duro-Bilt". This allegation was denied by Defendants.
The Court's order dismissing McKnights individually was based upon the Courts
belief that Goodman had failed to present evidence which would justifl "piercing the
corporate veil" of Defendant Dm-Biit. The only count that the theory of "piercing the
corporate veil" could apply to is Count I of Goodman's Complaint.
Count I alleges a breach of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement dated
August 2, 1995 between Goodman and Defendant Duro-Bilt. MeKnight was not a party
to this agreement.
The other three counts of Goodman's Complaint are tort theories of recovery
alleging interference with con-.

This contract is not the Property Owner's Vacation

Agreement referred to in Count I. This contract is the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and
Sale Agreement dated July 28,2004. The allegations of Counts 11, I11 and IV are made
against

Defendants. These tortious theories of recovery have their own elements and

do not inciude "piercing the corporate veil".
The allegations of Goodman's Complaint clearly allege separate and distinct
counts of breach of contract and tortious interference. In a case dealing with similar
issues, Davis v. Professional Business Sews., 109 Idaho 810, 813, 712 P.2d 51 1, 514
(Idaho 1985), substituted opinion at, Magic Valley Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Professional
Business Sews., 119 Idaho 558,808 P.2d 1303 (Idaho 1991), the Idaho Supreme Court

stated the following:
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All things considered, we view the trial court's characterization of
plaintiffs claim as one sounding in contract. Hence, judgment
entered against Helen Kolouch, president of defendant, for the
reconstruction costs must be reversed, for an officer of a
corporation is not liable for a breach of a contract made in the
corporation's name unless it can be shown that the "corporate veil
should be pierced to avoid unjust consequences inconsistent with
the corporation concept." Barlow 's, Znc. v. Bannock Cleaning
Corp., 103 Idaho 310,315,647 P.2d 766, 771 (Ct.App.1982); See
also, Paloukos v. Intermountain Chev. Co., 99 Idaho 740,742,588
P.2d 939 (1978). Here, there is no evidence to support piercing the
corporate veil; thus, we adhere to the general rule stated above
and reverse the district court's judgment entered against Helen
Kolouch.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that Kolouch is liable for the
reconstruction costs it incurred because her acts constituted a
tortious interference of the contracts between plaintiff and its
patients. We are not persuaded. Nothing in plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint alleges any such tort. Also, the only damages
found at trial were those [***IS] relating to the reconstruction
costs of plaintiffs ledger accounts. These damages are in no way
related to any injury suffered by plaintiff as a result of any alleged
interference with contracts between plaintiff and its patients.
Accordingly, no tort liability is assessable against Kolouch for her
part in breaching the contract entered into by plaintiff and
defendant.
In othenvords, the plaintiff failed to include tort allegations in his complaint. Such
is not the case here.
Goodman contends that both Defendant Duro-Bilt and Defendant McKnight are
liable to it for the following torts:
1.

Tortious interference with the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale
Agreement

2.

Negligent interference with the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and
Sale Agreement

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATlON OF ORDER
DISMISSING BART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT NDIVIDUALLY - Page 3

3.

Intentional interference with the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and
Sale Agreement

The Court's ruling dismissing McKnight individually fails to recognize the
difference between Goodman's single contract theory of recovery against Duro-Bilt and
Goodman's three tort theories of recovery against both Duto-Bilt and McKnight.
The Court is also directed to the Defendant's Answer filed October 12,2005. The
Answer refers to Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. and Bart and Alane McKnight
collectively as Duro-Bilt. Defendants own attorney makes no distinction between the
corporate defendant and individual defendants.
This litigation is the result of Defendant Duro-Bilt's breach of contract. That is
the starting point. Duro-Bilt's breach of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement led to
Duro-Bilt's and McKnight's interference with the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale
Agreement.
This entire dispute would never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had abided by the
contractual terms it agreed to in the Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement. But for
the breach of that agreement and McKnight's interdiction of Ordinance No. 3374 the
Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement would have closed.
It is an undisputed fact that the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement
existed. It is also an undisputed fact that the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale
Agreement had a single contingency

-

the vacation of First Avenue South in an

acceptable manner. Prior to entering into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Wylie,
Goodman had offered to sell its property to Defendants on the same exact terms as
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offered to Wylie. See, Bates Nos. 000178.

It is undisputed that Defendants had

knowledge of the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement
It is an undisputed fact that Duro-Bilt and McKnight knew of the sale of the
Goodman property to Wylie. Both Conley and Wylie will testify that they told Duro-Bilt
and McKnight of the sale and of the contingency. See, Bates Nos. 000178-000179.
Both Duro-Bilt and McKnight admit that they met with Wylie and were asked to
sign a consent to the vacation. See, Bates Nos. 000250-000251. According to McKnight,
Wylie visited him at his business 3 or 4 times. See, Bates Nos. 000250-000251. Wylie
asked Dm-Biltl McKnight to sign the consent f o m requested by the Nampa Fire
Department. See, Bates No. 000251. Wylie left Conceptual Site Plans with Duro-Biltl
McKnight. See, Bates No. 000252.
McKnight, Thorne and the Mayor had been on a ski trip together to Sun Valley in
March of 2004. Mayor Dale describes McKnight as a Eend. See, Bates No. 000180.
In his deposition, Mayor Dale co&rmed McKnight7smaterial, ex parte contact,
recalling that "he [McKnight] conveyed to me that, as a property owner on that street, he
did not agree to the vacation at this time. See, Bates No. 000181.
After Ordinance No. 3374 had been vetoed, McKnight told Goodman that he
wished to purchase Goodman's property where the car lot is located. See, Bates No.
000181. These lots are #11 and 12 and are located to the south of Duro-Bilt's lot.
It is also an undisputed fact that Goodman has suffered an injury as a result of the
reduced value of the Goodman property. See, Bates Nos. 000246-000247.
A prima facie case of tortious intderence with a contract exists where a plaintiff

has established: (a) the existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on part of
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the defendant, (c) intentional interference causing breach of the contract and (d) injury to
the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow v. Znt? Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,893,
522 P.2d 1102,1115 (1974). See also, Thirsty'sLLC v. Tolerico, 137 P.3d 435 (2006).
The knowledge element of the tort is "satisfied by actual knowledge of the
prospective [economic advantage] or by knowledge of facts which would lead a
reasonable person to believe that such interest exists." Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 87 Haw.
394,957 P.2d 1076, 1088 n. 16 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting W. P. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton and P. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 129 at 982 (5"hed.
1984) cited in, Highland Enterprises, Znc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996,
1004 (Idaho 1999).
Although proof of actual knowledge is not required, it cannot be disputed that
Defendants had either actual knowledge of the Goodmad Wylie sale or had knowledge
of sufficient facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the Goodman1
Wylie sale existed.
Once the elements of Goodman's claim are established the burden shifts to the
Defendants to prove a privilege or justification. McKnight and Duro-Bilt have completely
failed to assert any defense of privilege or justification to Goodman's tort claims. See,
Brief pages 26 and 28. Goodman contends that rather than dismissal of McKnight,
judgment as to his liability and Duro-Bilt's liability should be entered in Goodman's
favor.

In the case of Idaho First Nut? Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 824
P.2d 841,859 (Idaho 1991), The Idaho Supreme Court stated that:
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". . .after the plaintiff has established aprima facie case, "the burden is on the
defendant to prove justification." Footnote 15

'

' Footnote 15: With regard to justification for an interference, the Barlow
case noted:
"'Unlike the law of defamation, this branch of the law Eiterference
with contract] has not crystallized a complete set of definite rules as to the
existence or non-existence of privilege. *

* * The issue in each case is

whether the actor's conduct is justifiable under the circumstances;
whether, upon a consideration of the relative significance of the factors
involved, his conduct should be permitted despite its expected effect of
harm to another." Restatement of Torts $767, comment a at 63 (1939).
'What is "unwarranted" interference depends on the facts of each ease.'
Watson v. Settlemeyer, 150 Colo. 326,372 P.2d 453,456 (1962). See also,
Freed v. Manchester Service, supra, 33 1 P.2d at 691-692. When an action

involving interference with contract is tried to a jury, it is o r d i i l y for the
jury to determine whether the interference of the defendant was justified.
Mitchell v. Aldrich, supra, 163 A.2d at 837; Jachon v. O'NeiIl, 181 Kan.

930,317 P.2d 440,443 (1957).
"Otherwise justifiable conduct is rendered unjustified where
improper means, such as defamation, are employed by the defendant.
W.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts $ 129, pp. 936-37 (4th ed.
1971). See Calbom v. Knudtzon, supra, 396 P.2d at 151." Barlow v. Int?
Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881 at 893,522 P.2d 1102 at 1114 (1974).
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Duro-Bilt, although contractually bound to cooperate and having already
consented to the street vacation, broke its promises. This conduct was not only a breach
of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement, but also was an interference with the
Goodman1Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. McKnight's undisputed role as
instigator of Duro-Bilt's refusal to cooperate and of an illegal veto by the Nampa Mayor
are more than sufficient to withstand McKnight's Motion for Summary Judgment or
dismissal under IRCP 12(b)6.
The Defendants Duro-Bilt and McKnight, now bear the burden of proving
justification. None has been alleged by either Defendant.
Goodman respectfully requests the Court to reconsider its Order.
DATED this

isy

of October, 2006.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this wday of October 2006, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING BART AND ALANE
MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY was served upon opposing counsel as follows:

&

Tammy Zokan
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702

US Mail
personal Delivery
Facsimile
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
By:

Jn gbh

JON M. STEELE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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A

JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J. RUNF1: (ISB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFJKWES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9495
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele@runftiaw.com

F. IM L.*

DP.M.

CANYON COUNlY CLERK
T. CRAVVFORD,DEPUW

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

1
1

) CASE NO. CV 05-9800

1
vs.
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and
ALANE McKNIGHT, husband and wife;
and DOES I through V,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN
SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
DISMISSING BART AND ALANE
MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY

1

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Ada
)
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and
competent to make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own
information and belief, states as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING BART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT
INDIVIDUALLY - Page 1

1. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel
for the Plaintiff herein.

2. That I make this affidavit in support of Goodman's Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Bart and Alane McKnight Individually.

3. That this Court's Order was premised upon the fact that Goodman had failed
to provide the Court with facts justifying "piercing of the corporate veil".
4. That Goodman's Complaint has a single contract count (Count I) to which this

theory could apply.
5. That Goodman's Complaint has three tort counts (Counts 11, 111, and IV) to
which the theory of piercing the corporate veil has absolutely no application.

6. The elements of proof of Goodman's tort counts do not include "piercing the
corporate veil".

Goodman's claim is a direct action against McKnight,

individually.
Further, your affiant sayeth naught.

.tL, day of October 2006.
DATED this C(
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

,m

J
A
JON M. STEELE

Attorney for Plaintiff
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OQOQS?

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Ada
)

hkB\

On this *day
of October 2006, before me
,a
notary public, personally appeared JON M. STEELE, known to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the above document, and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
Notary Public for the State of Idaho
Residing at: R ) y @
My Commission Exp~res:3 -(

.0)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

The undersigned hereby certified that on this
day of October 2006, a true and
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING
BART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY was served upon opposing
counsel as follows:
Tamrny Zokan
Moore Smith
225 N. 9th, Suite 420
Boise ID 83702

US Mail
_ZL_ Personal Delivery
Facsimile

RUWT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorney for Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR
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SUSAN E. BUXTON # 4041'
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law
950 West Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1800
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
P. SALAS, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
INC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I
through V.

1
) Case No. CV 05-9800
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

1
Defendant.

1

COME NOW, Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. ("Duro-Bilt" or "Defendant"),
by an through their attorneys of record, Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit their
Response in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 22, 2006.
Defendant's Response is supported by this Response and Second Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan,
Defendant's Motions, Memorandum and Affidavits filed on June 16,2006 and June 29,2006, and
Defendant's Reply and Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan filed on August 29,2006.
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I.

SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

On July 3 1,1995, Plaintiff, Duro-Bilt, the Blamires Family Trust and T.J. Forest, Inc. entered
into a Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (the "Agreement" or "Vacation Agreement"),
whereby the parties to the Agreement agreed to the City ofNampa's vacation of First Avenue South
between Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition and the execution of subsequent agreements upon
the happening of the following conditions:
1.

City action approving the vacation of lStAve. S;

2.

The parties' grant among them themselves a perpetual easement on the vacated

property for access to and from each party's property, which access is to be at the discretion of
property owners;
3.

The parties' execution of an agreement defining their rights and obligations after

the City vacated the street;
4.

The parties' sharing of maintenance of the vacated property in proportion to the

amount of property they each own.
Complaint, Ex. A, 77 1-3.
Plaintiff filed an application for vacation on August 3, 1995. Plf 000044. The application
identified the reason for the applications as (1) so adjacent properties owners may more fully utilize
their properties; and, (2) the construction of a bank building. Id. On September 6, 1995, the City
notified Plaintiff that an ordinance approving the vacation would be prepared and approved upon
Plaintiff satisfymg three (3) conditions:
1.

Provision for storm drainage and public utilities.
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2.

Closure in a manner acceptable to the City Engineer.

3.

Provision for emergency access.

Plf 000098,000240. No ordinance related to the vacation was adopted in 1995 or anytime thereafker
prior to 2004. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that it attempted to satisfy the City's
conditions for vacation after the vacation was tabled in October 1995 and before 2004. See Plf
000241-242,000233.
The matter did not come up again until Mr. Ralph Wylie sought to purchase Plaintiffs
property in 2004. Plf 000203-206. On August 4,2004, the Nampa Fire Department issued a letter
stating its terms of agreement regarding the vacation. Plf 000046. The requirements included: (1) a
twenty foot (20') access easement, and (2) written approval of the Nampa Fire Department's access
requirement by all affected property owners. Id. The 20' access did not exist as a condition to
vacation prior to August 4,2004, hence the Fire Department's requirement for owner approval. See

Id., Plf 000046.
In the summer of 2004, Mr. Wylie approached Duro-Bilt and asked that it sign a new
document signifying its agreement to the Nampa Fire Department's August 4, 2004, 20' access
requirement. See Plf 000233,000250; Affidavit of Chris E. Yorgason in Support of Defendant's
Motions filed on June 16,2006 (hereinafter "Yorgason Aff."), Ex. B (Conley Tr.) pp. 47-51, Ex. 6.
After review, Duro-Bilt refused to sign the document because the 20' easement did not provide
adequate access to Duro-Bilt's property and would injure Duro-Bilt's business. Plf 000250-251,
253; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 45,l. 25, p. 46,ll. 1-7; p. 85,ll. 24-25, p. 86,ll. 1-14,
p. 90,11. 11-25, p. 91,ll. 1-22.
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Despite Duro-Bilt's objection, Mr. Wylie proceeded with the vacation application and the
Narnpa City Council approved the vacation of First Avenue South by Ordinance No. 3374. Plf
000251; Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.) p. 99,ll. 10-13. The Ordinance pursued by Mr. Wylie,
Ordinance No. 3374, was adopted by the City Council on August 16,2004. Complaint, Ex. C.
Ordinance No. 3374 conditions the vacation on a certain fifty-foot (50') access and utility
easement. Id. Duro-Bilt was not aware that OrdinanceNo. 3374 approving the vacation was before
the City Council nor did Duro-Bilt have any knowledge of the contents of any such Ordinance until
after the Ordinance was adopted on August 16,2004. Plf 000213,000253; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A
(McKnight Tr.) p. 63 1. 10-25, p. 64 1. 1-11, p. 87 1. 1-11, p. 88 I. 5-20, p. 89 1.8-25, p. 90 1. 1-3, p.
100 1. 2-24.
After learning that the City adopted an ordinance approving the vacation, Duro-Bilt contacted
the City to express its disagreement with the vacation. Duro-Bilt expressed its objection verbally on
or about August 19,2004 and by letter dated September 3,2004. Complaint, Ex. D; Plf 000253. The
basis for that objection was that 20' would not provide adequate access to Defendant's property and
Defendant's business "has grown to where it has need of access through the whole block from both
sides for industrial & agricultural vehicles, eighteen wheelers, commercial vehicles and general
traffic. . . . To restrict this street would cripple [Duro-Bilt's] business, frustrate customers and
become a traffic hazard." Complaint, Ex. D.' These concerns were based on the 20' easement

1 Defendant did not know the Ordinance imposed a 50' access and utility easement rather than
the proposed
20' access easement. Defendant does not know whether a 50' easement would
provide adequate access to Defendant's business. Yorgason Aff. Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 100 1.
2-25.
A
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required by the Nampa Fire Department and presented to Defendant by Wylie prior to the City's
adoption of Ordinance No. 3374. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 63 1.10-25, p. 64 1.1-1 1,
p. 87 1. 1-11, p. 88 1. 5-20, p. 89 1. 8-25, p. 90 1. 1-3, p. 100 1. 2-24.
According to Plaintiff, the 50' access and utility easement imposed by the City spoiled
Plaintiffs sale of its property to Wylie and devalued Plaintiffs property. Plf 000246, 000184.
According to Plaintiff, the value of the property was further reduced by twenty percent (20%) due to
the City's rezone of Plaintiffs property. Id.
The Vacation Agreement was not recorded until September 14,2004. Plf 000038.
On October 5,2004, Plaintiff sued the City and Duro-Bilt seeking a writ of mandamus for
publication of the Ordinance and a petition for judicial review challenging the City's reservation of
fifty-foot (50') access and utility easement. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition for Judicial
Review, Goodman Oil Company v. City of Nampa, et a1 and Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc.,
Case No. CV 04-10007. On June 29,2005, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Duro-Bilt
with prejudice for the reason that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Duro-Bilt upon which relief
could be granted. Zokan Aff., Ex. A. The Court also awarded Duro-Bilt costs and attorney fees in
the amount of $9,332.49. Id., Ex. D.
After dismissing Plaintiffs claims against Defendant with prejudice, the Court granted
Plaintiffs request for Preemptory Writ of Mandamus and issued its Order on August 8, 2005,
compelling the City to publish OrdinanceNo. 3374. Plf 000001-2,000004-5. Judge Morfitt found
and concluded that the act of publishing the Ordinance No. 3374 was a non-discretionaryministerial
function because:
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1.

The City Council passed Ordinance No. 3374; and

2.

The Mayor approved Ordinance No. 3374; and

3.

The Mayor relinquished possession and control of Ordinance No. 3374.

Second Zokan Aff., Ex. A, Goodman Oil Co.v. City ofNarnpa, CaseNo. CV04-10007, Hrg. Tr. pp.
38-39 (July 15,2005). Ordinance No. 3374 as adopted and subsequently published in accordance
with Court Order, provides for a 50' emergency and utility access easement. Plf 00001 1.
Even though Ordinance was adopted and then was published upon Plaintiffs demand,
Plaintiff continues to object to the City's requirement for adequate emergency and utility access and
the vacation is subject to ongoing litigation. See Plf 000012-54.
11.

A.

ARGUMENT

Defendant did not Breach the Vacation Agreement
There is no dispute that the 1995 Agreement was contingent upon the occurrence of specific

conditions, including vacation by the City of Nampa. Complaint, Ex. A,

7 1. Once vacated, the

parties were to grant themselves a perpetual easement on the vacated property for access to and from
each parties' property -- said access to be at the discretion of property owners. Id. at g 2. Then the
parties would execute an agreement defining their rights and obligations after the City vacated the
street. Id. at 7 3. The parties would then be responsible for maintenance in proportion to the amount
of property they own. Id.
There is no perpetual easement at issue in this case. There was not and could not be a
perpetual easement under the terms of the Agreement until there was a vacation by the City of
Nampa. Plaintiff did not attempt to fulfill the conditions for the vacation until 2004 and there was no

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
-Page 6

vacation until 2005 and that vacation is tied up in litigation brought by Plaintiff against the City of
Nampa. Plaintiff filed a vacation application on August 3, 1995, and the City of Nampa advised
Plaintiff that the vacation would be approved upon Plaintiff fulfilling three (3) conditions. Plf
000044, 000098, 000240. The only thing Plaintiff did was file the application; Plaintiff did not
fulfill or attempt to fulfill the required conditions until 2004. Id., Plf 000241-242. The conditions
and the grant was therefore defeated or never occurred as the result of Plaintiffs nonperformance.
Idaho Code $5 55-608, 55-609.
The failure of Plaintiff to meet the conditions imposed by the City in 1995 and achieve the
vacation of the street in accordance with the Agreement, or within a reasonable time, resulted in an
impossibility, impracticalityand frustration of the contract such that performance under the contract
was excused as a matter of law. As shown by the undisputed evidence in this case, Duro-Bilt has
acted fairly and in good faith under the terms of the Agreement. See Idaho Power Company v.
Cogeneration,Inc., 134 Idaho 738,746,9 P.3d 1204 (2000); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation,
141 Idaho 233,243, 108 P.3d 380 (2005). Defendant did not fail to perform any contractual duty
owed to Plaintiff. Id. Even if Defendant arguably had some contractual duty it failed to perform,
Defendant are legally excused from performance. Id.
If this Court determines that the parties are still bound by the Vacation Agreement, Defendant
has not breached the conditions of the Agreement, because:
1.

Performance of subsequent conditions is not due;
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2.

The vacation is tied up in litigation because Plaintiff disagrees with the terms of the

vacation and without resolution of the scope and conditionsof vacation, the matter is not ripe
for grant of a perpetual easement;

3.

There is no perpetual easement in the record and the Plaintiff has not proposed such

easement. Plaintiff admits that no perpetual easement has been drafted or granted and that
any perpetual easement would be conditioned on agreement by all parties, Yorgason Aff., Ex.

B, P 64;
4.

There is no evidence that Defendant has refused to discuss or cooperate with the

parties to the Agreement regarding the grant of a perpetual easement for each party to access
each party's property.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff andlor all the parties to the Vacation Agreement have
attempted to fdfill their obligation to grant and convey a perpetual easement providing for access to
each of their properties. Likewise, there is no evidence that Plaintiff andlor the parties to the
Vacation Agreement have presented a formal agreement regarding the parties rights and obligations;
no evidence that it is time to perform any of obligations Plaintiff alleges have been breached. Once
the City took final action on the vacation ordinance, Plaintiff commenced litigation against the City
and Defendant. The scope and conditions of the vacation then are currently unknown and cannot be
known until the matter is finally decided by the Court.
B.

Defendant is not Liable in Tort
The undisputed evidence shows Defendant has not intentionallyor negligently interfered with

Plaintiffs contract. Defendant did not cause injury to the contractual relationship or any economic
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damage to Plaintiff. See Thirsty's L.L.C. v. Tolerico, ---Idaho---, 2006 Opinion No. 62 (May 26,
2006). According to Plaintiff, the veto of OrdinanceNo. 3374, adopted on August 16,2004, caused
the sale of the property to Mr. Wylie to fall through. Complaint at 7 39. Plaintiff and Mr. Wylie also
identify the City's adoption of the Ordinance No. 3374 with the 50' access and utility easement
(along with the rezoning of the property by the City) as causing the sale to fail and decrease the value
of Plaintiffs property. Plf 000246-247. Defendant did not adopt and has no authority to adopt the
Ordinance that is the basis of Plaintiffs complaint. Likewise, Defendant did not impose and has no
authority to impose the 50' emergency and utility easement on the vacated property. Moreover,
Defendant did not veto nor does it have the authority to veto an Ordinance of the City. Finally,
Defendant did not play any part in the rezone of Plaintiffs property. The conduct framing Plaintiffs
Complaint isthe conduct of the City of Nampa, not Defendant.
Defendant acted reasonably and its actions were justified. Barlow v. International Hawest

Co., 95 Idaho, 881, 893, 522 p. 2d 1102 (1974)'
The issue in each case is whether the actor's conduct is justifiable under the
circumstances; whether upon a consideration of significance of the factors involved,
his conduct should be permitted despite its expected effect of harm to another. What
is "unwanted" interference depends on the facts of each case.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

In 2004, Plaintiff asked Defendant to agree to a 20' access easement which width is not

2 Plaintiff falsely asserts that Defendant has not argued that its actions were justified. See Plf s
Br. at p. 28 and Plf s Brief in Support of Reconsideration at p. 6. Plaintiffs assertions are
untrue. Defendant has repeatedly argued and the undisputed evidence in the record shows, that
Defendant has acted in good faith and its actions were justified. Def s Memo in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 20 and Def s Reply at pp. 14-15.
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adequate to access Defendant's property and is not sufficient to accommodate Duro-Bilt's customers
and suppliers. When Defendant later learned the Ordinance was adopted, it understood the vacation
was limited to the 20' proposed by wylie.' The evidence shows that Duro-Built contacted the City
government due to its concern about City action on what Duro-Bilt understood to be a vacation with
a much too small access easement. Because the 20' access did not provide adequate access to DuroBilt's property as expressly provided for in the Vacation Agreement; and, because the inadequate
access would negatively impact Duro-Bilt's property, Duro-Bilt inquired into the status of any such
action and asked how Duro-Bilt could participate in the process. Clearly, Duro-Bilt's actions were
reasonable and justified under the circumstances.
The undisputed evidence shows Duro-Bilt had no objective other than to protect access to its
property, which access is expressly provided for under the Vacation Agreement. Duro-Bilt had no
objective to harm Plaintiff nor did Duro-Bilt employ wrongful means to cause injury to the
prospective business relationship. See Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121
Idaho 266, 285-286, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). There is no allegation or evidence that Defendant
engaged in "conduct that violates the law, violence, threats, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation,
bribery or disparaging falsehoods. Id. at 286 fh.16. Likewise, there is no evidence Defendant used
"improper means, such as defamation" in contactingthe City. See Barlow v. International Harvester
Co., 95 Idaho at 893. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the evidence indisputably shows that
Defendant merely wanted to ensure access to its property. Defendant have advised Plaintiff of their

3 The evidence shows that Defendant did not know that the Ordinance adopted a 50' access and
utility easement rather than a 20' access easement. It is unknown whether 50' access easement is
sufficient for Defendant's customers and suppliers.
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access needs and told Plaintiff that Defendant would entertain ideas to address Defendant's needs.
Plf 000251-254; Yorgason Aff. 72. Defendants have acted reasonably and in accordance with the
Vacation Agreement.
If any alleged injury occurred to the contractual relationship, property value or any other
interest of Plaintiff, that injury was directly caused by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's purchaser's own
actions. As explained above, Ordinance No. 3374, adopted on August 16, 2004, specifically
conditions the vacation of First Avenue South on a certain 50' emergency and utility access
easement. The Ordinance was adopted upon Plaintzfs request; Defendant knew nothing about it.
The Ordinance was published and therefore became law at the behest ofPlaint8 who sued the City
and obtained a Writ of Mandamus compelling publication of said Ordinance. Plaintiff says it is the
size of the easement that resulted in the cancellation of the sale agreement. Finally, any alleged
decrease in the value of Plaintiffs property due to rezoning by the City is an issue between Plaintiff
and the City, not Plaintiff and Duro-Bilt.
The actual undisputed evidence of record shows that the 1995 Vacation Agreement was
based on a number of conditions, which conditions have not occurred and cannot occur until
Plaintiffs litigation over the vacation is resolved in the City ofNampa case; and, which Agreement
arguably has expired because the conditions were not llfilled within a reasonable time. The
undisputed evidence further shows that the Agreement expressly provided each party thereto access
to each party's property with said access to be a the discretion of each party after the vacation was
approved by the City.
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The undisputed evidence also shows that between 1995 and 2004 no one contacted Defendant
about the Agreement or vacation; that in 2004 Wylie asked Defendant to sign an agreement to the
Nampa Fire Department's 2004,207access easement, which access is not adequate to provide access
to Defendant's property. It is undisputed that Defendant did not know the vacation was back before
City Council; did not know OrdinanceNo. 3374 was pending before City Council; and did not know
the contents of Ordinance No. 3374. The undisputed evidence further shows that when Defendant
learned Ordinance No. 3374 had been adopted, Defendant immediately contacted their City
govement because of Defendant's concerns about adequate access to its property. The undisputed
evidence shows there was no intentional or negligent interferenceby Defendant to cause a breach of
contract, no wrongful means employed by Defendant, no duty owed to Plaintiff or breach thereof and
no a causal connection between the Defendant's conduct and the Plaintiffs injury and actual loss or
damage and that Defendant's actions were justified under the circumstances. The complained-of
conduct: (1) adoption of the Ordinance with the 50' easement, and (2) veto of the same Ordinance,
was entirely within the purview of the City, not Defendant.
There are no genuine issues of material fact on Plaintiffs contract and tort claims against
Defendant and Defendant, not Plaintiff, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
C.

Defendant is not Estopped from Contesting the Vacation Agreement
The Transcript of the July 15, 2005, hearing in the matter of Goodman Oil Co. v. City of

Nampa makes clear that the validity of the Vacation Agreement was not resolved in that matter.

First, the Court determined that Plaintiff raised no issues or claims for Duro-Bilt in the City
ofNampa case before entering its Order mandating publication of the Ordinance. Zokan Aff. Ex. A,
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D, E. The Court held that Plaintiff stated no claim against Duro-Bilt and dismissed all of Plaintiffs
claims against Duro-Bilt with prejudice. Zokan Aff., Ex. A. Second, the validity of the Vacation
Agreement was not decided in the prior proceeding. Second Zokan Aff., Ex. A, Hrg. Tr. pp 38-39.
As explained by Plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Steele, that the City ofNampa case "is a veto case.. .[olur
summaryjudgment is based upon the veto power of the mayor." Id. at p. 16,l. 3-4. The Court was
concerned only with the question of whether, as amatter of law, the Mayor had the authority to veto
the Ordinance after the City Council adopted it and the Mayor relinquished control over it and
directed the clerk to publish it. Id. at pp. 38-39. The Court noted specifically that it was undisputed
that the Ordinance was passed in the manner according to law. Id. at p. 37. The duty to publish the
Ordinance then became ministerial and there was thus a clear duty to act. Id. at p. 39. There was no
inquiry into or discussion of the underlying vacation or Vacation Agreement. See id. at p. 37-39.
The Judge did note the Mayor's asserted justification for the veto: the requirement for
landowner consent under Idaho Code 8 50-1321. Id. at p. 37,l. 9-13. However, it is clear from the
Judge's ruling in that case that the issue of landowner consent played no role in, and was unnecessary
to, the Judge's decision. See id. at p. 37-39. The validity of the Vacation Agreement was not
resolved in the other proceeding. Id.
The issue decided by Judge Morfitt is not identical to the issues in this litigation, the parties
are not the same, and the issues in this litigation are not and were not necessary to support the
outcome in the case before Judge Morfitt. Western Indus & Envt'l Sews., Inc. v. KaldveerAssocs.,

Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 887 P.2d 1048 (1994).

DEPENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
-Page 13

111.

CONCLUSION

Summary judgment in favor of Defendant, not Plaintiff, is appropriate in this case. The
undisputed facts show that Defendant is not in breach of any Agreement with Plaintiff and Defendant
have not intentionally or negligentiy interfered with any contractual relationship of Plaintiff nor
caused any damage to Plaintiff and Defendant's actions were justified. Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment should be denied and Defendant's Motion should be granted.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2006.
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIN3 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

1
)
)
) Case No. CV 05-9800
)
) SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY A.
) ZOKAN
)

GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
JNC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I
through V.

1
1
1
)

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

)ss.
County of Ada

1

TAMMY A. ZOKAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt in the above-

entitled matter and make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Transcript of the July

15,2005, hearing before the Honorable James C. Morfitt, District Judge, in Goodman Oil Company

v. City of Nampa, Case No. CV-04-10007, that I received from Plaintiffs counsel via email on
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September 11,2006.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

~amm~(&,&kan, o f tli/e Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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John M. Steele
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 343-3246
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THETHlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OILCOMPANY,
Petitioner,

I

1

1 3

1

5

1

6 the City of Nampa -- Goodman Oil versus the City of
7 Nampa.

CITY OF NAMPA, a corporate body )
politic; THE CITY COUNCIL of )
the CITY OF NAMPA; MAYORTOM )
DALE, in his capacity as Mayor )
of the City of Nampa; DhNA )
LAMBING, in her capacity as )
City Clerk; and SCOTPI'S
)
DURO-BELT GENERATOR, INC.,
)
an Idaho corporation,
)

8
9

10
11
12
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14

15
16
17
REPORTFA'S TRANSCRIPT
- BE IT IIEMEhIBERED. that thc above-entitledrnatter came on
regulvly for a hearing on .MO~IUDS
to Strikc and Writ of
Mandate on Frihy July 15. 2005, Caldwcll, Idaho, bcforr
the Honorable James C. Mottilt, District Judge.
~~

PROCEEDINGS

4

)
) CaseNo. CV 04-10007

VS.

CALDWELL, IDAHO, FRIDAY, JULY ISTH, 2005

~

18
19
20
21
22

Andrea L. Chandler, RPR

23
24
25

THE COURT: Okay. We're now ready to move on to

MR. KORMANIK: Good afternoon, Judge.
THE COURT: Good afternoon.
MR. STEELE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Good afternoon.
Mr. Steele and Mr. Runft appear on behalf of
the plaintiffs. And Mr. Kormanik appears on behalf of
the City of Nampa. Mr. Jorgenson on behalf of Scotty
Duro-Bilt is not appeating. And I guess that answers my
question as to whether or not their motion -- or the
objection on attorney's fees has been noticed. I did
not fmd that it had been. So apparently it has not.
Is that your understanding?
MR. STEELE: That's correct.
MR. KORMANIK: I believe that's correct.. Judee.
THE COURT: This case is before the Court today.
The City of Nampa has filed a motion to strike and have
filed a second motion to strike. And the plaintiffs
have filed a motion for summary judgment on the Writ of

-
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APPEARANCES

1 Mandate issued.

2
For the Petitioner: RUNFT & STEELE
By: Jon M. Steele, Esq.
By: Karl J. Runfl , Esq.
1020 West Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 333-8506
Facsimile: (208) 343-3246
jmsteele@runfllaw.com
For the Respondents: WHITE PETERSON
By: John R. Kormanik, Esq.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405

jkonnanik@whitepeterson.com

Are those the three matters that we have

3 before US today?
4
MIL KORMANDK: That's correct, Judge.
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
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THE COURT: Okay. Probably, we need to take up
the motions to strike first, and then we'll take up the
plaintiffs inotion for summaryjudgment. I'll hear
can we take both of these up together?
MR. KORMANK Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: They're somewhat related.
MR.KORMANIK: Yes.
THE COURT: Very well, you may proceed.
MR. KORMANIK: The initial motion to strike filed
by Mr. Ilallam deals with some statements in the brief in
support of the motion for summary judgment that allude
to Mayor Dale's veracity. And I believe that's why
Mr. Hallarn moved to strike them. I understand that -THE COURT: It doesn't actually allude to his
veracity. Doesn't it allude to the fact that the Court
might be called upon to -MR. KORMANIK: To weigh.

--

II

1 be it the Court in the court trial, or the jury in a
2 jury trial always have to do?
3
MR. KORMANIK: Yes, Judge, it is.
4
THE COURT: Okay. But, also, isn't that some of
5 the language in that California case, Polscamp?
6
MR. KORMANIK: I hate to say three yeses in a row,
7 but, yes, Judge, it is. Other than what Mr. Hatlam has
8 filed, and with the questions of the Court, we will
9 simply rest on what he filed for that fvst motion.
10
The second motion to strike, however, deals
11 with a supplemental affidavit filed by the petitioner in
12 this matter. The petitioner filed a supplemental
1 3 affidavit along with their responsive briefmg. Under
1 4 Rule 56, the move in for summary judgment must file
1 5 their motion, along with supporting affidavits, no later
1 6 than 28 days before the hearing date, which, in this
17 case, initially was done.
18
The supplemental affidavit doesn't comply with
1 9 Rule 56,so we would request the Court strike it and not
2 0 consider its contents.
THE COURT: I believe that was filed in support of
21
2 2 both summaq judgment and in opposition of the motion to
2 3 strike, is the way it's headed.
24
MR. KORMANIK: But I don't believe anything in any
2 5 of the contents -- and, again, this would require the
Page 5
1 Court to review it -- any of the contents of the
2 attachments to that supplemental affidavit deal with the
3 legal question of whether or not the Court is ultimately

4 going to be tasked with determining and weighing the
5 evidence before it.

6
7
8

9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

And so notwithstanding the title of the
supplemental affidavit, 1 think the substance of it
deals with the summaryjudgment motion.
THE COURT: Let me ask you one question on your
first motion to strike. Normally I see motions to
strike, affidavits, and exhibits, and the like. Seldom
do I see motions to strike statements in memoranda. And
I was -- I'm a little intrigued if you have any
authority for that?
I am well aware that opposite parties
generally disagree with many statements that are made in
memoranda.
MR.KORMANIK: So back to the Court's question
whether or not Mr. Hallam -- who unfortunately isn't
here.
Again, Judge, I think it was just simply to
bring to the Court's attention the concern of theNampa
respondents with regard to whether or not Goodman Oil
was calling into question the Mayor's veracity,
especially given some other statements in the summary

1 judgment briefmg dealing with a supposed friendship
2 between the Mayor and the president of Scotty's
3 Duro-Bilt, and things along those lines.
4
It was simply to bring to the Court's
5 attention the fact that if the petitioner was calling
6 into question the Mayor's veracity, then that's not a
7 proper -- a motion for summary judgment before the Court
8 is certainly not a proper avenue for that.
9
THECOURT: Okay.
MR.KORMANIK: Thank you.
10
11
THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate that.
12
Anything from the plaintifPs on that matter,
1 3 Mr.Steele?
14
MR. STEELE: Yes, Your Honor.
15
The motion to strike the statement concerning
16 Mayor Dale's veracity points out the problem presented
1 7 to the case -- to the Court in this case. The
18 inconsistency of a mayor's veto being invoked in this
1 9 situation places the Court in an unusual situation of
2 0 having to potentially rule upon the veracity of the
2 1 Mayor's testimony.
22
In this case -23
THE COURT: But, again, isn't that - I think
2 4 that's what I have to do in case after case, or the jury
2 5 has to do if it goes to jury trial.
Page 7

1
MR. STEELE: Should we have a jury trial, the jury
2 would be presented with that situation, yes.
3
And, Your Honor, we found the Mayor to be
4 entirely truthful in this case. There's no allegation
5 that he did not tell the truth. He was entirely
6 forthcoming about his friendship with MI. McKnight, and
7 the ski trip that he took with Mr. McKnight to Sun
8 Valley. There was no allegation that he was dishonest
9 in any way. I believe the motion to strike should be
1 0 summarily denied.
11
In regard to the second motion to strike,
1 2 concerning my affidavit, which I filed seven days ago,
1 3 I'd like to point out to the Court that the City of
1 4 Nampa has, in their brief, asked this Court to enter
1S summary judgment on their behalf. And that authority -1 6 under the authority of the case of Harwood versus
1 7 Talbert, this Court is empowered to grant summary
1 8 judgment to the Nampa respondents, even if the Narnpa
1 9 respondents have not filed their own motion with the
20 Court.
21
Your Honor, I had to read the brief two or
22 three times to actually catch that statement. But once
2 3 1 caught it, I felt obligated to submit an affidavit in
2 4 opposition to the summaryjudgment motion submitted on
2 5 behalf of the Nampa respondents.
Page 8
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1
THE COURT: But that affidavit has to be filed,
2 under the rule, within 14 days of an affidavit in
3 opposition; does it not?
MR. KORMANIK: That's correct, Your Honor.
4
5
MR. STEELE: That's correct.
6
THE COURT: At least 14 days.
7
MR. STEELE: At least 14 days.
8
And should the Nampa respondents feel at a
9 disadvantage in any way, we're very agreeable to coming
1 0 hack in 14 days. All those matters contained in my
11 affidavit are already part of the court record. There
1 2 have been extensive affidavits filed in this case
1 3 already. I submitted the affidavit in order to make it
1 4 easier for the Court to follow the testimony in this
1 5 case. And I believe that motion should also be denied.
16
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
17
Any response on either issue?
18
MR. KORMANIK: Not unless you have any questions
1 9 for me, Judge?
20
THE COURT: I don't believe that I do.
21
I have reviewed this. The Court will deny
22 Nampa's motion to strike the portions of the
23 petitioner's -- I'm sony. The Court will grant the
2 4 motion to strike that portion of the petitioner's brief.
2 5 I will also grant the motion to strike the affidavit.
Page 9

--

1 It was not filed timely. If it is a brief or an
2 afftdavit in opposition of summary judgment, so I will
3 order both of those stricken.
4
If you'd prepare an order on both of these,
5 please?
6
MR. KORRIANIK: I will, Judge. Thank you.
7
THE COURT: Now, moving on to the plaintiffs
8 motion for summaryjudgment on the Writ of Mandate
9 issue.
Mr. Steele?
10
11
MR. STEELE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you for the
1 2 opportunity to appear before you today on this important
1 3 case. This case is one of first impression of the State
1 4 of Idaho. It deals with the veto power of the executive
1 5 of a city in the state of Idaho. The veto power, as
1 6 you're aware, is a legislative function. It's an
1 7 exercise of the legislative branch.
18
And it is inappropriate that it be exercised
1 9 in connection with a quasi-judicial proceeding. The
2 0 facts of this case are, for the most part, undisputed.
2 1 The only disputed facts that the City of Nampa lists are
2 2 in their memorandum at pages 8 and 9. None of those
2 3 facts relate to the exercise of the Mayor of his veto
2 4 power.
Your Honor, if you recall, this case involves
25
Paae 10

1 a vacation of a section of 1st Avenue South in the city
2 of Nampa. My client, Goodman Oil, owns property on both
3 sides of 1st Avenue South. There are several other
4 property ownen adjoining 1st Avenue South. And in the
5 summer of 1995, those property owners joined together
6 and executed a propertylowner vacation agreement,
7 agreeing to vacate 1st Avenue South in front of their
8 adjoining properties.
9
That agreement, Your Honor, is very clear.
1 0 The first paragraph in the agreement states: "We
11 consent to the vacation of 1st Avenue South." The
12 application for vacation was filed with the City of
1 3 Nampa, proceeded to public hearing, a staff report was
1 4 prepared. The report recommended approval of the
1 5 vacation of 1st Avenue South.
16
The ordinance was prepared, the ordinance was
1 7 read at two Council meetings, and then tabled. That
1 8 ordinance sat on the table until the summer of 2004, at
19 which time it was brought back before the Council, and
2 0 it was asked that it be acted upon. The third reading
2 1 of the ordinance was completed. It was completed on
2 2 August 16th of last year.
23
The ordinance was presented to the mayor,
2 4 Mayor Dale. At that Council meeting on August 16th, the
2 5 Mayor signed the ordinance indicating his approval. He
Page 11
1 handed the ordinance to the clerk, the clerk testified
2 his signature by executing the ordinance, and the clerk
3 left the Council meeting with that o r d i i c e . The clerk
4 then sent the ordinance to the newspaper to be
5 published.
6
Before the ordinance was published, on August
7 19th, Mr. McKnight, the president of Scotty's Duro-Bilt
8 and adjoining property owner, called Mr. White, the city
9 attorney, and indicated that he had a problem with the
10 street vacation ordinance. Mr. White referred
11 Mr. McKnight to Mr. Holm. Mr. Holm is the planning
12 director of the City of Nampa and has been for the last
1 3 26 years.
14
Mr. Holm is the one who made the decision that
1 5 the street vacation should proceed, that the proper
1 6 consents had been obtained, and that the ordinance was
1 7 ready to be approved. On August 19th, or thereabout,
18 when he spoke to Mr. McKnight, he advised Mr. Mcknight
1 9 that if he no longer consented, be needed to somehow get
2 0 that back before the City Council.
21
Mr. McKnight took it upon himself to phone the
2 2 Mayor. The exact date that he talked to the Mayor, I
2 3 don't know. But in that phone conversation, the Mayor
2 4 recognized Mr. McKnight as his friend, as a man who had
2 5 -- excuse me -- the Mayor as a man who had taught
Paae 1:
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1 Mr. McKnight's children. The Mayor also recognized
2 Mr. McKnight as the fellow he had taken a ski vacation
3 to Sun Valley with the previous year.
4
According to Mr. McKnight, the Mayor
5 unilaterally volunteered to veto the ordinance. When he
6 volunteered to veto the ordinance, he had not reviewed
7 the file in any way. He'd not seen the property owner's
8 vacation agreement. He'd not seen the correspondence
9 from &city of Nampa to my client, Goodman Oil,
1 0 reaffirming the fact that the application was still
11 pending. He'd not talked to Mr. White or to Mr. Holm.
1 2 He simply volunteered to veto.
13
Your Honor, the ordinance was vetoed. It was
1 4 vetoed on September 2nd, just last fall. The following
1 5 day, September 3rd, the City received Mr. McKnight's
1 6 written objection withdrawing his consent to the
1 7 property owner vacation agreement to the vacation of 1st
1 8 Avenue South. My client immediately went to the City
1 9 Council and asked that that be remedied.
20
The City Council refused to -- the City
2 1 refused to reconsider the Mayor's veto that led to this
2 2 action. Your Honor, the reason this is an important
2 3 case is, that it presents you with a fundamental
2 4 question in the separation of powers. We have the City
2 5 Council, who, in this situation, is acting as a
Paoe 1 3
1 quasi-judicial body. And there's no doubt about that.
2
The cases are clear, when the City acts in a
3 quasi-judicial body, they are bound by the same
4 standards as you're bound by in this situation we're
5 presenting here today. We're bound by due process
6 requirements. The City admits this proceeding was a
7 quasi-judicial proceeding. The end result, Your Honor,
8 is that a veto is simply inconsistent with a
9 quasi-judicial proceeding.
10
The cases, particularly the case of Tombs
11 versus King County, are very defGte on this point. In
1 2 that case it was a zoning case, Your Honor. A similar
1 3 case, but the application of a general ordinance to a
1 4 specific piece of property. That's what we have here:
1 5 A general ordinance dealing with street vacations and
1 6 its application at 1st Avenue South.
17
In that case, the court was very clear. It
1 8 recognized that the veto power is inconsistent with a
1 9 proceeding under for a quasi-judicial body. The
2 0 reason they're inconsistent, is that, in that case, the
2 1 executive, and in our case, the Mayor, is an elected
2 2 ofticial. It's impossible to insulate him against
2 3 contact. And in this case, the Mayor was quite frank.
2 4 He takes calls from all constituents.
25
THE COURT: The city councilmen are elected

--
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1 officials, also; isn't that true?

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. S'EELE: The city councilmen are elected
officials, also. But at some point, Your Honor, the
record is set. There is no more fact gathering to be
done. And that is the due process requirement.
MR. KORMANE Judge, I hate to intermpt. But if
1may, Counsel's argument with regard to whether or not
Mayor Dale has the authority under the statutes or the
Nampa City Code to veto a street vacation, I don't
think, is relevant to the issue of whether or not this
Court should issue a Writ of Mandate.
The statutes are what the statutes are. If
this Court determines that Goodman has a legal right to
have the ordinance published, and that Goodman Oil also
satisfies the other requirements for a Writ of Mandate,
then under the writ statute, the Court will issue the
writ. Whether or not the constitutional issue of
whether the Mayor has the authority to veto a street
vacation ordinance, I don't think, is relevant to this
summaryjudgment, or the writ proceeding.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. I'll note that. I'm going to
hear the argnments from both sides.
MR. KORMANIK: Thank you.
THE COURT: Each side will have their say.
Paoe 1
You may continue, Mr. Steele.
M1L STEELE: Thanks, Your Honor.
Your Honor, this is a veto case. Our summay
judgment is based upon the veto power of the mayor. The
exercise of a veto is inconsistent with the
quasi-judicial nature of these proceedings that were
before the City Council. In addition, street vacation
is a very specific procedure.
In the case of Black versus Young, Judge
McDevitt was very clear, street vacation proceedings are
governed by 50-311 and those several other statutes
found in chapter 50. The powers of the city are found
in that section. And the city has no powers beyond what
are found in that section. And there is no veto power
found in the section dealing with street vacations.
Your Honor, the third reason why we're
entitled to summryjudgment is that Mayor Dale believes
he has the power to both veto and approve an ordinance.
The statute granting the mayor the power of veto is very
specific. The mayor has the power to approve or to
veto. He does not have the power to approve and to
veto. Mayor Dale believes that he has the power to do
both. I believe he's incorrect. The statute is very
clear; it is one or the other. He cannot do both.
Your Honor, the fourth reason we're entitled
Page 1
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1 to summaryjudgment in this case is that when Mayor Dale

2 approved the ordinance and parted with possession and
3 control of the ordinance on August 16th --excuse me.
4 August l6th, yes. When he handed it to the city clerk,
5 and the city clerk left with the statute, he lost the
6 right to veto that ordinance. That's the Polscamp case
7 that's cited in our brief, Your Honor. When he parted
8 with possession and control, he lost whatever veto power
9 he had.
10
In snmmary, Your Honor, there simply is no
11 veto power that exists in the mayor of the city of Nampa
1 2 to veto a street vacation proceeding. It's a power that
1 3 is inconsistent with a quasi-judicial proceeding It's
1 4 inappropriate and a violation of due process that he
1 5 exercised in this case.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let's hear from the
16
1 7 City of Nampa on the issue.
18
MR. KORMANIK: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
At the outset, I feel compelled, on behalf of
2 0 the Mayor and the City, to take issue with some of
2 1 Counsel's statements with regard to the relationship
2 2 between the Mayor and Mr. McKnight, the president of
2 3 Scotiy's Duro-Bit.
24
Counsel alluded to the fact that the Mayor
2 5 instantly recognized Mr. McKnight as a friend. Well,
Paae 1;8

1 Council. Now, there's evidence in the record that the
2 landowners in 2004 are not all the same landowners that

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

signed the street vacation agreement. And that's
important, because under the street vacation statute,
each adjoining landowner must consent to the vacation,
otherwise, as a matter of law, it cannot happen,
regardless of what the City Council does.
The City Council can approve it, but it would
be contrary to law. And that's important in this case,
because Goodman represents to the Court, and their
11 entire argument appears to be based on the fact that
1 2 everybody agreed in 1995, so evetything in 2004 was
1 3 proper. And that's just not the case, Judge. There are
1 4 other property owners involved.
15
And there's evidence in the record before the
1 6 Court that those property owners do not agree to
1 7 vacating that street. Additional businesses have been
1 8 located there. The property owners who located those
1 9 additional businesses, specifically Blazen Burgers, I
2 0 thii is the name of the business, say that they need
2 1 that street for customer access.
22
And those owners, the Blarnires, were never
2 3 parties to the original street vacation agreement. And
2 4 Goodman never obtained their consent to vacate the
2 5 street in 2004, which is when, presumably, the street
Paae 1:

1 would have been vacated when the City Council acted on
2 the ordinance finally.
3
And that's very important, because, I t h i i
3 he'll tell you that he and the Mayor aren't friends.
4 at the end of the day, what Goodman is asking this Court
4 They know each other, they're acquaintances, they run
5 to do would be contrary to law. If the Court issues a
5 into each other, but they're not friends.
6 writ forcing the City to publish an ordinance vacating
6
Counsel also alluded to the fact that the
7 1st Avenue South, and all of the landowners along 1st
7 Mayor taught Mr. McKnight's children band in school.
8 Avenue South do not agree to that street vacation, it's
8 Well, if you look at the affidavit submitted 9 contrary to law.
9 Mr. Runft's affidavit submitted in support of summary
i0
THE COURT: Doesn't the statute provide that any
1 0 judgment, Mr. McKnight's specific testimony is: "Did
11 agreed person may appeai after publication?
11 your children have the Mayor as their band insttuctor'l"
12
MR. KORMANIK: Yes, it does, Judge.
1 2 And the answer was, "No, sir." So I just -- on behalf
13
THE COURT: And publication triggers the time for
1 3 of the Mayor, I feel compelled to respond to those
1 4 appeal?
1 4 statements.
MR. KORMANIK: Yes, it does. Absolutely. And I
15
15
Now, the undisputed facts in this case are:
1
6
was
going to raise that in regard to whether or not a
1 6 In 1995 Goodman obtained a street vacation agreement by
17 writ is even appropriatein this circumstance. But,
1I the adjoining landowners of 1st Avenue South. And the
1 8 yes, the landowners affected along the street would have
1 8 Nampa City Council fust considered whether or not to
1 9 the avenue of appeal under 15-1322, I believe is the
1 9 vacate 1st Avenue South. Also, in 1995, Goodman was
2 0 required to communicate with the Nampa f r e marshal with 2 0 statutory provision. That's correct, 15-1322.
21
But I ask myself, does it make sense for the
2 1 regard to access for ingress and egress. It didn't do
2 2 Cout to publish -- to order published an ordinance that
2 2 so. And that's evidenced in Exhibit C, page 2 to
2 3 there's evidence in the record is going to be challenged
2 3 Mr. Runft's affidavit.
2 4 on appeal because not all the landowners consent, and
Nine years later Mr. Goodman wants to sell the
24
2 5 property and puts the issue back before the City
2 5 not all of the landowners' consent was sought by the
Page 2(
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1 Judge, there's nothing in the record about that. In

2 fact, I believe if you look in Mr. McKnight's testimony,
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1 applicant? So it's contrary to 50-1321, which requires

2 all the consent of the adjoining landownem.
3
Also important, I think, and the undisputed
4 fact is, the ordinance was never published. And I think
5 that takes us out of the ambit of the California case
6 relied on -- the Polscamp case relied on by Goodman. In
7 that case, Mayor Bradley signed the ordinance, it was
8 taken out of his control, and it was published in the
9 manner which the statute required in Los Angeles. Then
10 the Mayor attempted to veto it.
11
Well, the Polscamp court said, no, you can't
12 do that, because it's already been -- it's left your
1 3 control. It's been published. All the statutory
1 4 requirements have been satisfied. So you can't now go
1 5 back and change your mind, or attempt to veto a properly
1 6 passed and enacted ordinance.
17
In this case, the ordinance was never enacted.
1 8 And there's a difference. Although, it's a highly
1 9 technical difference, I think. The Mayor signed it, the
2 0 clerk had it, but it was never published. So it was
2 1 never effective.
THE COURT: It never became effective under the
22
2 3 statute, but is publication a ministerial function as
2 4 opposed to some kind of discretionary function?
MR. KORMANIK: Well, Judge, I think in most cases
25
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1 it's ministerial. But I think, in this case, it is not,

2 because of the specific requirements that all of the
3 landowners along the street grant their consent. And,
4 also, given the facts and circumstances of this case
5 with nine years passing between the fmt time it was
6 brought before the City and Goodman sought to vacate the
7 street, and then the action in 2004. I think there may
8 be a difference.
9
I don't think that in this case it was purely
1 0 ministerial, given the facts and circumstances known at
11 the time that the o r d i c e was vetoed. A Writ of
1 2 Mandate is only appropriate, as the Court is aware, if
1 3 the applicant demonstrates it has a clear legal right
14 and does not have a speedy, just, and adequate remedy of
1 5 law.
16
The Nampa respondents argue that there's no
17 clear legal right, and there is a plain, adequate,
1 8 speedy remedy at law. And I'm going to address those in
1 9 reverse order just for my argument's sake.
20
Interestingly, 50-1322 specificallyprovides
2 1 for an appeal from the refusal of an application of a
2 2 street vacation. Now, if the application is refused,
2 3 then it goes without saying that it's never going to be
2 4 published. So the refusal -- the time period begins
2 5 when it's refused, and the parties become aware of that.
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Goodman, interestingly, in its reply brief
says, no, wait a second -- pages 10 and 11 says, no,
wait a second, 50-1322 may say what it says, the
procedure is no longer valid. Judge, that simply is not
founded in the law. The statute 50-1322 gives an
applicant, or any other effected party the legal right
to appeal. The procedure for that appeal is irrelevant.
The right is established in 50-1322.
The procedure is set forth now in Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure 84, and the specific provisions of
that. And we've been before the Court before on this,
that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in writ
proceedings. So there is a plain, speedy, adequate
remedy at law.
There is no impending sale of the property.
There is no evidence in the record, whatsoever, that the
normal appellate process that Goodman had available to
it would not have satisfied the requirements of a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy.
Interestingly, also, Goodman has included in
its filings with the Court its notice of tort claim. I
think that goes along in conjunction with the appeal
process. If they had a problem with or a concern about
the process that was utilized by the City of Nampa
between -- any time between, really, 1995 and September
Paae 2

1 of 2004, they had an appeals process to deal with it.

2 So a writ is not appropriate, because there is a plain,
3 speedy, and adequate remedy.
4
Also, a writ is not appropriate because

5 Goodman cannot demonstrate a clear legal right to the
6 relief it seeks. Goodman contends that the Mayor has
7 absolutely no right to veto a street vacation ordinance.
8 That just goes contrary to Idaho Code and the Nampa City
9 Code. Idaho Code Section 50-6.1 specificallystates
1 0 that the mayor shall have the power to veto or sign any
11 ordinance passed by the city council. It doesn't say,
1 2 except for street vacation ordinances.
13
And it's important to note that -although we
14 didn't brief this, the Court is well aware that statutes
1 5 are presumed constitutional. So there's no reason to
16 think that 50-61 1 is not a constitutional grant of
1 7 authority to mayors of the cities of this state, whether
1 8 they be for other ordinances, or with regard to city
1 9 street vacation agreements.
20
The Nampa City Code Section 2-2-2-5 also
2 1 grants the mayor the power to veto any ordmance.
22 That's presumed constitutional as well. So the question
2 3 of whether or not the mayor actually has the authority
2 4 to veto a street vacation agreement, I t h i i has been
2 5 answered by the statutes, which are presumed
Page 2
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1 constitutional.

2
Whether or not the veto was appropriate,
3 again, I've distinguished Polscamp, I believe, for the
4 Court. Here the ordinance was never published. Here
5 the Mayor became aware of facts and circumstances, which
6 indicated that the ordinance was not in compliance with
7 the Idaho Code, which requi1.e~consent of all the
8 adjoining landowners. So Polscamp, I th& is
9 distinguishable. The same standard that a general
1 0 ordinance of a general nature, unless otherwise required
11 by law, before they take effect must be published.
12 That's also set forth in the Nmpa City Code, 2-2-3-7.
13
There is a plain, speedy, adequate remedy at
1 4 law, which Goodman has made allusion -- alluded to -1 5 not allusion, I'm sorry -- in it's filing, saying it
1 6 would be useless to file an appeal because the City's
1 7 position is already stated. Well, the City's position
1 8 is stated, because Goodman needs to procure the consent
1 9 of all the adjoining landowners.
20
It's not the City's job to get the consent of
2 1 everyone along 1st Avenue South to vacate that street.
22 It's Goodman's job, because they're the applicant. They
2 3 have not been able to do that, so they are seeking
2 4 resort in the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Mandate
2 5 because they can't now get the present adjoining
Page 25

1 function rather than a discretionary function. And I
2 think somewhere there's a requirement that it be
3 published within a certain number of days.
4
MR. KORMANE Judge, I believe that -5
THE COURT: I'm ttying to find that in here.
6
MR. KORMANIK: That might be in 50-901. If that's
7 what the Court is referring to. It says -8
THE COURT: Published within 30 days?
9
MR. KORMANE "Shall before they take effect and
1 0 within one month after they are passed" -11
THE COURT: Okay. Yes.
12
MR. KOIWANR -- "be published in full."
13
THE COURT: Okay. So that's a statutory
14 requirement?
MR.KORMANLK: Yes.
15
16
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. I think that's all I
1 7 had.
18
MR. KORMANIK: Thank you, Judge.
19
THE COURT: Mr. Steele, anything W c r ?
20
MR. STEELE: Your Honor, just a couple of items.
21
The Nampa City Code granting the mayor the
22 power of veto does not trump the Constitution of the
2 3 United States, or the Constitution of the State of
2 4 Idaho, the due process requirements; the pronouncements
2 5 of the Idaho Supreme Court dealing with how to conduct
Page 27
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I th* under the circumstances, issuance of
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1 public hearings, providing appropriate notice,
2 conducting fact finding, cutting off fact fmding, and
3 then rendering fmdings of fact and conclusions of law.
a Writ of Mandate is not appropriate in this matter.
4
And, in fact, it's not available to Goodman Oil.
The exercise of a veto power by the mayor is
5 simply inconsistent with the subject matter that we're
And, finally, Judge, as I've stated previously
6 dealing with in this case. The veto is inconsistent
in my argument, I think what Goodman is asking the Court
7 with the proceeding - a quasi-judicial proceeding. The
to do, is to publish an ordinance that is conto
statute. The Court has evidence in the record that all
8 veto power of the mayor is not found in the street
9 vacation sections of the Idaho code. And the veto power
of the landowners do not consent to the vacation of that
1 0 given to the mayor does not include the power to do
street. And if the Court were ordered to order the City
11 both approve and veto. It's one or the other.
of Nampa to publish the o r d i i c e , it would be ordering
12
Your Honor, I believe that the legal arguments
it to publish an ordinance that violates 50-1312 of the
1 3 are simply overpowering. The veto was simply
Idaho Code.
1 4 inappropriately exercised in this case. We're entitled
Judge, that's all I have. We'll rely on our
1 5 to a Writ of Mandate. The possible appeal that is
briefmg. If you have any questions, I'd be happy to
1 6 mentioned by the City of Nampa is certainly no reason to
take them.
17 delay the entry of judgment in this case.
THE COURT: Now, Narnpa's ordinance 2-2-3-7 talks
18
There is a difference between a remedy and a
about the effective date of an ordiiance. And it
1 9 procedure. A possible appeal that is mentioned is a
clearly -- and this goes along with the prior sections.
2 0 procedural item, not a remedy. We're entitled to the
There's passage of the ordinance by the city council,
2 1 remedy of publication of this ordinance. And I believe
there is approval by the mayor, and followed by
2 2 it's very clear.
publication.
T h d you, Your Honor.
23
MR. KORMANIK: Correct.
24
THE COURT: What about the issue raised by counsel
THE COURT: Okay. And I asked you a minute ago
2 5 that there was not consent of all the adjoining
whether or not publication was strictly a ministerial
Page 28
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1 landownen?
2
MR. STEELE: Consent's a threshold issue, Your
3 Honor. The consent issue was addressed by Mr. Holm when
4 he determined that the proceeding should go forward,
5 that the street vacation proceeding was entitled to its
6 third reading or final reading, and that the ordinance
7 was entitled to be passed by the city ordinance, and was
8 entitled to be approved by the mayor.
9
That's Mr. Holm's function. That's what he
1 0 does. That's his job. He's the expert in this area.
11 He's the one that recommended that the proceedings go
12 forward.
THE COURT: Now, procedurally, the request when it
13
14 was first filed in, what, 1995?
15
MR. STEELE: The summer of 1995.
THE COURT: Yeah. What happened in 1995?
16
17
MR. STEELE.. A hearing was held, a staff report was
1 8 prepared. At the hearing the staff report was presented
19 to the City Council. The staff report recommended that
2 0 the street be vacated. No one appeared in opposition at
2 1 the hearing. The fact finding process was closed. The
2 2 ordinance was read at the next two council meetings.
2 3 And at that point it was tabled.
24
THE COURT: And in 2004 it was taken off the table?
MR. STEELE: It was taken off the table for its
25
-

1 Sedwicks 119 Idaho 539.
2
To withstand the motion for summary judgment,
3 the nonmoving parties' case must be anchored in
4 something more soiid than specuiation. A mere scintilla
5 of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of
6 material fact. That's Edwards versus Chemco, Inc. at
7 111Idaho851.
8
III reviewing this, this is an application for
9 a Writ of Mandate. Rule 74 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
1 0 Procedure deals with Writs of Mandate. It provides
11 that, "Any party wishing to contest an application for a
1 2 peremptory Writ of Mandate must file a responsive
1 3 pleading to the complaint or petition in the same manner
1 4 as an answer to any other civil complaint or any other
1 5 complaint in a civil action. The plaintiff or
1 6 petitioner may then proceed against such responsive
1 7 pleading in the same manner as any other civil action!'
18
Clearly, summary judgment is an appropriate
1 9 method for the petitioners to proceed against -- for the
2 0 City to proceed against -- the petitioners to proceed
2 1 against the responsive pleading filed by the City.
22
Rule 74 (d) deals with judgment -- trial and
2 3 judgment in the matter. Idaho Code Chapter 3 Title 7
2 4 also deals with Writs of Mandamus. It provides, "The
2 5 district court may issue such to compel performance of
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1 f d reading. Thank you.
2
THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further in light
3 of that, Mr.KO&?
4
MR. KORMANIK: No, Judge.
THE COURT: I have spent a considerable amount of
5
6 time looking at this matter. This is before the Court
7 on the issue of summaryjudgment on the claim for an
8 application for a Writ of Mandate. It seeks an order
9 compelling the City of Nampa to publish Ordinance No.
1 0 3374 vacating 1st Avenue South between 2nd Street South
11 and 3rd Street South in Nampa.
12
Again, as I noted in the preceding case, that
1 3 summary judgment is appropriate where the plead'mgs,
1 4 depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file show
1 5 that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and
1 6 the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
17 law.
18
The burden, at all times, of proving the
1 9 absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests upon
2 0 the moving party. That's G&M Farms versus Funk
2 1 Inigation Company at 119 Idaho 514.
22
In considering a motion for summary judgment,
2 3 the Court must liberally constme the facts and
2 4 inferences contained in the existing record in favor of
2 5 the party opposing the motion. That's Bonds versus
Paae 30
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1 an act which the law speciallyjoins as a duty resulting
2 from an office, tmst, or station." 7-303 requires

3 that, "A writ must be issued in all cases where there is
4 not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
5 course of law."
6
In this case we have proceeded through this
7 matter. The petition has been filed, the response to
8 the pleadings have been filed, discovery bas been
9 engaged in, and we're now before the Court on the
1 0 petitioner's motion for summaryjudgment. Appropriate
11 notice has been given to the parties.
12
This 1s an issue arising from the
13 consideration by the Nampa City Council of an ordinance
1 4 to vacate a street. Idaho Code 531 1 spec~fically
1 5 empowers cities to both "create, open, widen, or extend
1 6 any street, avenue, alley, or lane, as well as to vacate
1 7 the same whenever deemed expedient for the public good."
18
It provides for the reversion of any vacated
1 9 land. Idaho Code Section 50-1321 provides for the
2 0 necessity for the consent of adjoining property owners.
2 1 Specifically, it provides that, "No vacation of a public
2 2 street shall take place unless the consent of the
2 3 adjoining owners be obtained in writing and delivered to
2 4 the public highway agency having jurisdiction over the
2 5 public street or right of way."
Paqe 3:
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1

50-1322 provides for an appeal by any person
2 aggrieved. It requires that it be made withiii 20 days
3 after the first publication or posting of the statement
4 as it required. Idaho Code 50-901 deals with the
5 effective dates of ordinances and requires that, "They
6 shall, before they take effect, and within one month
7 aRer they are passed, be published in full or in
8 summary as provided in the other code sections."
9
Idaho Code 50-902 provides for the procedure
1 0 for the passage of ordinances. 50-61 1 provides that,
11 "The mayor shall have the power to veto or sign any
1 2 ordinance passed by the city council." And provides for
1 3 an override of any veto, which is not in issue in this
1 4 particular case.
15
Idaho Code 67-5279 provides for a judicial
1 6 review, along with Rule 84 of the Rules of Civil
1 7 Procedure. The type of relief available in judicial
1 8 review is specified in 67-5279, which provides that, "If
1 9 the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside
2 0 in whole or part and remanded for further proceedings as
2 1 necessary."
22
The Nampa City Code deals with the passage of
2 3 ordinances. Section 2-2-3-3 provides for how an
2 4 ordinance is passed. Nampa City Code 2-2-3-4 provides
2 5 that, "When an ordinance is passed, the city clerk shall
Paae 33
1 sign it, and the date of passage by the council shall be

2 added thereto, and it shall, within three days
3 thereafter, be presented to the mayor for his approval,
4 If he approves the same, he shall attach his signature
5 thereto."
6
2-2-3-5 provides for basically a veto and an
7 override of that veto, and also for the effect of the
8 mayor's neglect or refusal to sign the ordinance where
9 he returns it with his objections in writing.
10
The date of passage of an ordinance is set out
11 in Nampa City Code 2-2-3-6. Considered passed on one of
12 the following dates, the date of approval by the mayor.
1 3 Nampa Code Section 2-2-3-7 provides that, "An ordinance
1 4 shall take effect and be enforced from and after its
15 passage, approval, and publication." It further
1 6 provides that, "An ordinance shall be deemed published
1 7 when it appears in one issue of the official newspaper
1 8 published within the city."
19
That is the Bamework that this case is
2 0 presented in. The standard of review of a district
2 1 court's failure to issue a Writ of Mandamus is the same
2 2 as that required of the district court. The party
2 3 seeking a Writ of Mandate must establish a clear legal
2 4 right to the relief sought.
25
Additionally, the writ will not issue where
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in the ordinary course of law. That's Almagren versus
Idaho Department of Lands at 136 Idaho 180.
"A Writ of Mandamus will lie if the officer
against whom the writ is brought has a clear legal duty
to perform, and if the desired act sought to be
compelled is ministerial or executive in nature and does
not require the exercise of discretion." Again, that's
the Almagren case.
"Proceedings for a Writ of Mandamus are not
available to review. The acts in respect to matters as
to which they are vested with discretion unless it
clearly appears that they have acted arbitrarily and
unjustly and in abuse of the discretion vested in them."
That's Brady versus The City of Homedale at 130 Idaho
569.
Again, also holding that a Writ of Mandamus
will not lie unless the party seeking the writ has a
clear right to have it done -- to have done that which
the petitioner seeks, and unless it is the clear legal
duty of the officer to so act.
A Writ of Mandate will not issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act. Our Supreme Court
has previously held that -- this Court has repeatedly
held that mandamus is not a writ of right. The
Paae 3

1 allowance or refusal of such a risk is a matter of
2 discretion with the court before whom the application is
3 heard. That's Hunky versus Foot at 84 Idaho 391.
4
The Supreme Court has held that, "Mandamus
5 will lie if the officer against whom the writ is sought
6 has a clear legal duty to perform the desired act, and
7 if the act sought to be compelled is ministerial or
8 executive in nature." That's Idaho Falls Redevelopment
9 Agency versus Countrymen at 118 Idaho 43.
10
The existence of an adequate remedy in the
11 ordinary course of law, either legal or equitable in
1 2 nature, will prevent the issuance of a writ. And the
1 3 party seeking the writ must prove that no such remedy
1 4 exists.
15
The Court has examined Polscamp versus
1 6 Martinez, the California case cited by the petitioners
1 7 in this matter. That's 2 California Appellate 4th at
1 8 854. In that case there is somewhat of a difference
1 9 between the factual scenario there and the factual
2 0 scenario in this case; in that, in that case the
2 1 ordinance was published.
22
The California appellate court concluded that
2 3 under the Los Angeles city charter, the ordinance was
2 4 still in the process of being adopted, although, it was
2 5 still in the possession of the mayor. Therefore, the
Page 36
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1 and concludes that the act of publishing the ordinance

court held that during the time the legislation was
under his custody and control, there is nothing to
prevent the mayor from reconsidering any action as to
his approval or disapproval of the ordinance.
The notes say, "However, it must be concluded
that once the chief executive has relinquished
possession of the legislation with his signature and
transmitted it to the appropriate depository agent" -in this case, presumably, the city clerk -- "the
measures' character as a properly enacted law becomes
immutable," the City of Palm Springs versus Ringwald at
52 California 2nd 620.
The California Supreme Court has also held
that a mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the city
clerk to publish an ordinance, so long as the proposed
ordinance meets the requirements of law, and the act
demanded is a ministerial duty.
In this case, I think the issue presented is
one of fmt impression. I don't think there is any
factual dispute, but that the Nampa City Council passed
the ordinance in question. That's ordinance 3374. They
passed it on August 16th in the mauner required by law
and by Nampa ordinances.
On that date, the Mayor -- again, I don't
think there's any factual dispute at all that the Mayor
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is strictly a ministerial function. It is not a
discretionary function. The City Counoil had already
enacted -- had passed the ordinance in the manner
required by law. The Mayor had approved the ordinance.
The Mayor released it fiom his possession and control.
And the act of publication is strictly a ministerial
act. It's not a discretionary act.
The Court £in& that the Nampa city clerk had
a clear legal duty to perform the desired act, and that
the act that is sought to be compelled is ministerial
and not discretionary. The Court farther finds that the
petitionefs have established that they do not have an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, either
legal or equitable in nature such as will prevent the
issuance of a writ.
Specifically, the appeal right given is
triggered by publication or posting the ordinance
approved in the publication or posting. The judicial
review, if they were successful, simply remands it to
the Nampa City Council for fnrther action.
The Court finds that the ordinance was
previously passed by the Nampa City Council, approved by
the Mayor, and that there is no adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
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1 s i ~ e and
d approved that ordinance on the same date.
2 The Mayor then declared the ordinance be passed, and
3 directed the city clerk to report it as required by law.
4
The city clerk delivered the ordinance to the
5 Idaho Press Tribune on August 17th with instructions
6 that it be published. Prior to publication, the city
7 clerk contacted the Press Tribune and canceled the
8 publication request.
9
And on September 2nd the Mayor then vetoed the
1 0 ordinance, asserting that one of the property owners
11 adjacent to 1st Avenue South had withdrawn its consent
1 2 to the vacation. And that's the factual scenario that
1 3 leads to this case.
14
The statutes and ordinances of the City of
1 5 Nampa set forth the procedure for the city council to
1 6 pass an ordinance, set forth a procedure for the
1 7 ordinance that is passed to be transmitted to the mayor,
1 8 and for the mayor to approve the ordinance.
19
In this case, the Mayor did approve the
2 0 ordinance, he relinquished control of the ordinance to
2 1 the clerk with the direction that it be published, and
2 2 subsequently withdrew it from the --had the clerk
2 3 withdraw it from the Idaho Press Tribune, and then
2 4 vetoed it.
25
The Court, in reviewing the case law, finds
Page 38
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1
The Court so fmds and concludes, and I will
2 issue the Writ of Mandate for the publication of the
3 ordiice.
4
If you would prepare an appropriate order and
5 writ please and submit it to me, Mr. Steele.
6
MR. STEELE: Yes, Your Honor, I will.
7
THE COURT: Now, we still have pending the petition
8 forjudicial review. If the City -- I will -- I don't
9 know. The City of Nampa might desire to, since it's the
1 0 question of first impression, appeal - if it will take
11 an interlocutory appeal on this matter or not. I will
1 2 not sign the order or the writ for a period of five days
1 3 so you can make any motions that you may want to stay
1 4 the action or to appeal interlocutory.
15
MR. KORMANIK: Judge, I would simply ask that
1 6 Counsel prepare the order with a 54 (b) certificate, and
1 7 then I can consult with the City of Nampa about what
1 8 action to take. But if the 54 (b) certificate is
1 9 included, then we have that action available without
2 0 further action of the Court.
21
THE COURT: I would ask that you do that, please,
2 2 MI. Steele. With respect to that, if thereis an
2 3 interlocutory appeal, as I understand the law, I would
2 4 be the vested jurisdiction on the remaining issues in
2 5 this case until that appeal is decided. So I'll just
Page 40
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1 throw that out so that both parties are aware that there
2 is also that issue. I think I'm S i t e d to doing only

I

3 thethings I can do while the case is on appeal.
4
MR. KORMANIK: Judge, that's correct. And I've had
5 some recent experience with 54 (b), and there may be
6 some circumstances where you could potentially proceed
7 with the decision on the judicial review of the
8 ordinance.
9
Especially in this case, because I think
1 0 publication of the ordinance is wholly separate. And a
11 judicial review of the procedure and the decision of the
1 2 city council with regard to the width of easements is
1 3 sufficiently different from that. But, of course, that
1 4 would be up to the Supreme Court and yourself.
15
THE COURT: Okay. And that can be addressed
1 6 depending on what happens. I'm just throwing that issue
1 7 out because I know it's there.
18
MR. KORMANIK: Thank you, Judge.
19
THE COURT: Is there anything else that we need to
2 0 address, Counsel?
21
MR. STEELE: Not at this time, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you both very much.
2 2 Your briefing and arguments were very enlightening. And
it was very helpful in understandii the whole matter.
23
MR. STEELE: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And we'll be in recess.
24
MR. KORMANIK: Thank you.
25
(The proceedings were concluded.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
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GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
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SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
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Case No. CV 05-9800
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN
OBJECTION T O PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

1
1
)

COME NOW, Defendants Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. and dismissed Defendants Bart
and Alane McKnight ("Duro-Bilt" or "Defendants"), by an through their attorneys of record, Moore,
Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit their Response in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion
for Reconsideration received on October 4, 2006. Defendants' Response is supported by this
Response and the pleadings and supporting documents filed by Defendants in this matter.
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I.

SUMMARY

Plaintiffs Complaint named Defendants Duro-Bilt Bart, Inc. and Bart and Alane McKnight
as defendants, alleging that Bart and Alane McKnight were the "alteregos " of Defendant Duro-Bilt.
Complaint at

77 2-3.

Plaintiffs Complaint alleged the named "Defendants" breached "their"

obligations under the Vacation Agreement and "their " actions caused various torts against Plaintiff.
Complaint, Counts 1-4.

Plaintiffs Complaint prays for relief against "Duro-Bilt," requests

judgment be entered "against Duro-Bilt, " requests "a decree requiring Duro-Bilt to speciJically
perform, " and requests an award of costs and fees "againstDuro-Bilt. " Complaint at p. 10,711-3.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety against Bart and Alane
McKnight because Plaintiff did not plead or make any showing that Bart or Alane McKnight are
alter egos of Duro-Bilt and should be held to he personally liable for the obligations of Duro-Bilt.
See Def s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support

(filed on June 16,2006); see Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936,940,950 P.2d 1275 (Ct. App.
1997). Plaintiff filed its response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to
dismiss on August 22,2006, but failed to object to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or provide any
support for its theory that the McKnights were the alter egos of Duro-Bilt and should be held
individually liable, or otherwise address Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plf s Br. in Response to
Def s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 22,2006).
The Court dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint against the McKnights on September 5,2006, and
entered its written Order of Dismissal on September 19,2006.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSDDERATION Page 2

OQ)8%30

On October 4, 2006, Plaintiff served its Motion for Reconsideration on Defendants. The
Motion asserts a new legal theory for Plaintiffs claims against Defendants; it does not assert new
facts to provide a basis for this Court's reconsideration of its Order dismissing Bart and Alane
McKnight. Plaintiff did not previously offer any legal theory to support its claims against Bart or
Alane McKnight individually nor any defense against Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore,
at hearing on September 5,2006, Defendant failed to assert any position remotely resembling the
position asserted in its Motion for Reconsiderationreceived on October 4,2006. Plaintiffs having
failed to present any defense to Defendants Motion to Dismiss when it had the opportunity, should
not be allowed to craft its theory for the first time, or re-craft its theory, after the Court has rendered
its decision.

11.
A.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs Attempt at a Second Bite of the Apple Must Fail.
Plaintiff is not entitled to raise new legal theories at this late date. Plaintiffhas submitted, for

the first time, the legal theory that "piercing the corporate veil" is not a requirement to hold Bart or
Alane McKnight individually liable for alleged torts. While neither Plaintiffs theory nor any alleged
legal basis therefore is clear, Plaintiffs delinquent attempt to withstand dismissal should fail.
Plaintiff does not allege that its new theory has resulted from new facts, a change in the law, or
otherwise was unavailable to it during litigation of the issue. Plaintiff could have and should have
raised any defense to Defendants' Motion in its briefing and at argument. It did not. Plaintiff should
not be allowed to raise new theories or switch theories and re-litigate old issues when said theories
were available to Plaintiff at the appropriate time.
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The Ninth Circuit's treatment of motions for reconsideration is instructive: "A motion for
reconsideration ... should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district
court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or where there is an
intervening change in the law." McDowell v. Caleron, 197 F.3d 1253 (9&Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). (In federal court there is no specific rule motions for reconsideration and such motions
may be evaluated under Fed. R.Civ. Pro. 59(e) motion to alter or amend, or 60(b) motion for relief
from judgment.) There are no highly unusual circumstances warranting reconsideration of the Order
of Dismissal entered in this case.
B.

There is no Basis to Reconsider the Court's Order of Dismissal.
Plaintiff has not submitted new evidence in support of its Motion for Reconsideration.

"When considering a motion [pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(2)(B)], the trial court should take into
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory
order. The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts." Coeur
D'Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812821, 800 P.2d 1026

(1990); Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57,64,72 P.3d 897 (2003) (without supporting affidavits, there
was no basis for asking the trial court to reconsider its earlier decision"). The Affidavit of Jon M.
Steele in Support of Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration does not present new facts. Mr.
Steele's Affidavit merely restates portions of Plaintiffs Complaint, Affidavit at T/n 4-5, and asserts
Plaintiffs new legal theory that "piercing the corporate veil" is not required to hold an individual
liable for alleged torts, Affidavit at 17 5-6.
Even if this Court were to consider Plaintiffs new legal theory, Plaintiff has cited no
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authority for its new theory. The case cited by Plaintiff, Davis v. Professional Business Sews., 109
Idaho 810,813,712 P.2d 51 1,514 (1985), did not hold that aplaintiffneednot meet the elements for
piercing the corporate veil when a plaintiff has alleged tort. Plf s Br. in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration at pp. 2-3. In Davis, the plaintiff failed to allege tort violations and the court
determined that it could not assess any tort liability against the individual defendant. Id. at p. 3;

Davis at 815. The court did not issue a holding on the elements of the tort claims in that case.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs Complaint was filed against Bart and Alane McKnight "as alter

egos" of Duro-Bilt, Inc., alleging "their" actions and they as "Defendants" breached their
obligations and committed various torts. Indeed, Plaintiffs prayer for relief seeks relief only as
against the corporation. While Plaintiff attempts to re-craft is allegations against Bart McKnight,
Plaintiff still has not presented any facts related to Alane McKnight individually. In any event,
Plaintiff has not requested any relief against Bart or Alane McKnight, made no attempt to meet the
standard for piercing the corporate veil, and still has not alleged a claim against Bart or Alane
McKnight upon which relief can be granted.
111.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration should be denied, the Court's Order of Dismissal
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)affirmed, and Defendants should be awarded attorney
fees and costs incurred in responding to Plaintiffs Motion Idaho in accordance with Code §§ 12-120
and 12-121.
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DATED this 16th day of October, 2006.
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

~ a r n m vZokan
~.
\
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of October, 2006, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONSE by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Jon M. Steele
Karl J. F. Runft
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com

-U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
-Overnight Mail
__ Facsimile

2

Tammy A. Zokan

1

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE LN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Page 7

JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9495
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteelciiirunftlaw.com

I

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
P. SALAS, DEPUTY

--

I

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR T m COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
VS.

SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR,
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife;
and DOES I through V.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 05-9800

GOODMAN'S REPLY BRIEF

1
Defendants.

)
)

COMES NOW Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company by and through its counsel of
record, Jon M. Steele and submits its Reply Brief in support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment.
The Court is referred to Goodman's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability (pp. 2-12) for the course of proceedings in the

Goodman Mandamus Proceeding before Judge Morfitt and the facts leading to this
litigation.
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I.
GOODMAN SEEKS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE OF
DEFENDANT DURO-BILT'S LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF THE PROPERTY
OWNERS VACATION AGREEMENT.
a. Duro-Bilt Consented to the Vacation of First Avenue South.
The Vacation Agreement executed by Duro-Bilt in 1995 contains Duro-Bilt's
consent to the vacation of First Avenue South. Consent is a prerequisite to the vacation
of any street. Idaho Code § 50-1321.
The only Duo-Bilt consent provided to the Nampa Planning Director, to the
Nampa City Council and to Judge Morfitt was the Vacation Agreement executed by
Duro-Bilt in 1995. No one but Duro-Bilt believes consent is an issue in this case.
The issue of Duro-Bilt's consent was administratively resolved by the Nampa
Planning Director and has been judicially resolved by Judge Morfitt.
b. Duro-Bilt Failed to Contest the Vacation Ordinance.

The City of Nampa in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding made the same exact
argument; that is, Duro-Bilt did not consent to the vacation. See, Reporter's Transcript of
July 15, 2005 before Judge Morfitt, pp. 19-42.

Goodman delivered the original

Reporter's Transcript to Judge Hoff on September 12,2006.

In the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding Judge Morfitt addressed this issue by
pointing out to the City that Idaho Code 8 50-1322 entitled, Appeal from Order Granting
or Denying Application to Vacate, provides that any "aggrieved" person may appeal the
grant or denial of an application for vacation.

GOODMAN'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 2

However, the appeal must be made within 20 days after the fist publication of the
vacation ordinance. The City's vacation ordinance was published on September 5,2005.
See, Notice of Compliance with Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, attached as Exhibit A.
Duro-Bilt's consent was required for the vacation of First Avenue South. If DuroBilt objected its only remedy was to appeal within 20 days of September 5,2005. DuroBilt, despite being a party to the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding and despite receiving
the Notice of Compliance with Peremptory Writ failed to appeal. Duro-Bilt's failure to
appeal binds it to Judge Morfitt's resolution of this issue. Judge Morfitt's ruling was
accompanied by an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate. Neither Duro-Bilt, McKnight nor the City
of Nampa appealed his decision.
c. Duro-Bilt is Estopped From Contesting its Consent and the Validity of the
Vacation Agreement.
Duro-Bilt's claims concerning its consent and the validity of the Vacation
Agreement were resolved in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding. Duro-Bilt is estopped
from raising those issues, again, in this litigation. See, Goodman's Brief in Response to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability, pp. 15-18.
As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 3 19-320,

78 P.3d 379,386-387 (2003):
Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of
issues adjudicated in prior litigation between the same parties is a
question of law upon which this Court exercises free review.
Mastrangelo v. Sandshom, Znc., 137 Idaho 844, 846, 55 P.3d 298,
300 (2002). There are five factors that must be considered in
determining whether collateral estoppel will act as a bar:
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1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier
case; 2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the
issue presented in the present action; 3) the issue sought to be
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; 4) there was
a fmal judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and 5) the
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the prior litigation.

Western Indus. and Environmental Services, Inc. v. Kaldveer
Associates, Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 544, 887 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1994).
Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata)
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Under principles of
claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by
a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent
action between the same parties upon the same claim. The three
fundamental purposes served by res judicata are:
First, it "Epresewes] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the
burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private
interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent
relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action
which were actually made or which might have been made.

Hindmarsh v. Mock 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)
(citations omitted).
Goodman has been in litigation concerning the vacation ordinance for two and a
half years.

Duro-Bilt had the opportunity to contest its consent in the Goodman

Mandamus Proceeding. It failed to do so. Despite Duro-Bilt's failure to contest the issue
of consent, the City of Nampa contested the issue. The Goodman Mandamus Proceeding
bars Duro-Bilt from raising the issue of consent to the Vacation Agreement. Goodman
should not have to relitigate the same exact issues in this case.
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11.

DURO-BZLT BREACHED THE VACATION AGREEMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Property Vacation Agreement is an enforceable contract. The Agreement did
not lapse. The Agreement includes all necessary terms for its enforcement.

The

Agreement provided consideration. Neither is Duro-Bilt excused from performance.

See, Goodman's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintips Motion for S m a r y Judgment on Issues
of Liability, pp. 14-22.
The Vacation Agreement is an enforceable contract. That issue is resolved. See, I
(a), (b) and (c) above. The breach of the Vacation Agreement as a result of Duro-Bilt's
conduct is also established as a matter of law. Duro-Bilt's breach consists of the
following:
1. In July and August 2004, Duro-Bilt refused to cooperate and consent to the

vacation procedure in breach of the Vacation Agreement covenants.
2. Despite Duro-Bilt's refusal to consent and cooperate, Ordinance No. 3374

vacating the street was passed and approved.
3. Duro-Bilt (through McKnight) was the instigator of the illegal veto of
Ordinance No. 3374.

4. Duro-Bilt, to this day, contends it has not consented, still refuses to cooperate
in the vacation of the street, and refuses to recognize the validity of the
Vacation Agreement.
Both parties agree that the Vacation Agreement is not ambiguous and that its
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interpretation is a matter of law.
The language of the Vacation Agreement is plain and clear. Duro-Bilt's various
contentions are without merit.

111.
BOTH DEFENDANT DURO-BILT ANI) DEFENDANT MCKNIGHT
INTERFERED WITH GOODMAN'S SALE TO WYLIE
Goodman's action for interference with the GoodmadWylie Sale Agreement is a
direct action against both Defendant Duro-Bilt (a corporation) and against Defendant
McKnight (an individual). Goodman need not pierce the corporate veil to establish
liability on behalf of Defendant Duro-Bilt or Defendant McKnight. See, Goodman's
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Bart & Alane
McKnight Individually.
It is ordinarily for the jury to determine whether the interference of the Defendant
was justified. See, Idaho I" National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, -,

824 P.2d 841,859 (Idaho 1991) A note 15.
However in this case, once the Court determines the validity and breach of the
Vacation Agreement, as a matter of law Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on
the issue of liability of both Defendants for their interference with the GoodmadWyIie
Sale Agreement. Should the Court not agree with Goodman this issue is one for
detennination by the jury.
In regards to the Defendants defense, the only affiiative defenses raised in their
Answer are estoppel, lack of consideration and waiver. See, Answer, p. 8, paras. 69, 70
and 71.
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Defendants fail to assert a defense of privilege or justification. This Court could
interpret Duro-Bilt's contention that the Vacation Agreement is unenforceable as an
afftrmative defense. But once the Vacation Agreement is found enforceable under any or
all of the legal theories advanced above by Goodman, the Defendant's only affirmative
defense fails.

IV.
CONCLUSION
In August of 2004 a unique opportunity was presented to the City of Nampa and
the property owners adjoining First Avenue South. An experienced developer was
willing to invest his time, effort and capital into a development that would have
enhanced the gateway to Nampa. Duro-Bilt and McKnight killed that opportunity. It
may be years before that opportunity presents itself again.
Duro-Bilt, although conkactually bound to cooperate and having already
consented to the skeet vacation, broke its promises. The result is the one Defendants
intended and had hoped to achieve. Defendants are directly responsible for torpedoing a
development that would have enhanced the gateway to Nampa.
Defendants now must bear responsibility for their ill conceived choices and
conduct of August 2004. Defendant's motions should be summarily denied.
Goodman is entitled to summaryjudgment on the issues of liability. The issue of
damages will be addressed at kid.
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DATED this )\O day of October, 2006.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
JON M. STEELE
Attorney for Plaintiff

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
day of October 2006, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing GOODMAN'S REPLY BRIEF was served upon opposing
counsel as follows:

2US Mail

Tammy Zokan
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702

-Personal Delivery

x Facsimile

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

~ttornebfor Plaintiff

-
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euum CLERK

CAMYON

G USOG. DEPUTY

Terrence R. White
T. Guy Hallam, Jr.
John R. Kormanik
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB Nos.:
1351,6101,5850
trw@whZtepeterson.com
tgh@whitepeterson.com
jkormanik@whZtepeterson,corn

Attorneys for Respondents.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
VS.

1
I

Case No.: CV 04-10007

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
CITY OF NAMPA, a corporate body politic; PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS
THE CITY COUNCIL of the CITY OF
NAMPA, MAYOR TOM DALE, in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Nampa;
DIANA LAMBING, in her capacity as City
Clerk; and SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT
GENERATOR, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Respondents.

I

--

-

- --

COME NOW, the City of Nampa, the City Council of the City of Nampa, Mayor Tom
Dale, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Nampa, and Diana Lambing, in her capacity as the

I
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NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH

-

--

EXHIBIT

City Clerk (hereinafter "Nampa Respondents"), by and through their attorneys of record, the law
firm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Court Order, and hereby file this Notice of Compliance

with Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.
On or about September 5, 2005, the Ordinance at issue in this case was published,
pursuant to and in accord with Court order, by the City Respondents. Attached hereto as Exhibit
"A" is a cbpy of the Affidavit of Publication.

DATED this 22d day of September, 2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument was served upon the following by the method indicated:

-Hand Delivered

Jon M. Steele
RUNFT & STEEL LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main St., Ste..#400
Boise, ID 83702

7
axed
-

Christopher E.Yorgason
MOORE, SMITH, BUXTON & TURCKE
225 N. 9" St., Ste. #420
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivered
/Mailed
L ~ e d
208.331.1202

DATED
- ? - !$ i h

"%ailed

208.343.3246

Q

ay of September, 2005.

W\WoIXWWwwmpa CityiGoodmn Oil Co\Pkadin@\pld notlcc ofcampliancc-wilh writ of mandnmvs 0 9 d Z - 0 5 . d ~ ~
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224 11th Ave, So.
Nampam 83651

STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of Canyon

i

1 SS.

Amanda K. Anderson
of Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho, being
fvst duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. That I am a citizen of the United States,
and at all times hereinafter mentioned
was over the age ofeighmn years, and
not a patty
. . to the above entitled action.
2. That I am the Principal Clerk of the
Idaho Press-Tribune, a dally newspaper
published in the City of Nam a, in the
County of Canyon, State of !l'daho; that
the said newspaper is in general
Circulation in the said County of
Canyon, and in the vicinity of Nampa
and Caldwell, and has been
unintemxptcdty published insaid
County during a period of seventy-eight
consecutive weeks prior to the f i ~ t
publication of this notice, a copy of
which is hereto attached
3. That the notice, of which the annexd is
a printed copy, was pubUshed in said
newspaper 1 time(@in the regular
and entire issue of said paper, and was
printed in the newspaper proper, and not
in a suppltmenc
4. That said notice was published the
Fonowine:

County of Canyon

)

.

the year of

naUy appeared.

known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed lo the within
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